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INTRODUCTION 
It’s early in the morning and though there may be a long day of 
work ahead, the alarm clock is easy on the ears.  The clock radio 
on the nightstand has the alarm set to “radio,” and the radio itself 
has been set to WFUV 90.7 FM, Fordham University’s own lis-
tener-supported public radio station.1  Instead of the dreaded ban-
shee wail of an alarm clock, a modest pair of speakers pipes radio 
programming into my bedroom that starts my day perhaps the way 
a cup of coffee does for many others.  In a radio market the likes of 
New York City’s, the dial of which can often seem as congested as 
rush hour on the subway, WFUV is a welcome reprieve.  My 
analysis is subjective, but it would seem that in a medium driven 
by advertising revenue, in an area with as high a population density 
as New York City’s, market conditions create a sort of diluted con-
tent on the radio, the quality of which, one may suspect, often 
plays second fiddle to the goal of increasing advertiser revenue by 
way of attracting the highest volume of listenership possible.2 
By way of comparison, WFUV is a not-for-profit, noncommer-
cial entity whose funding comes from the voluntary contributions 
of its listeners and corporate “underwrit[ers].”3  This support en-
ables WFUV largely to escape the need experienced by most 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2886.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2009; Bachelor of Arts, 
English, Amherst College, 2002.  I would like to acknowledge the enjoyment and avail-
ability of music generally as the inspiration for this Comment, and the support of my 
family and friends for helping me stay true to said inspiration, even in a law journal foot-
note.  I would especially like to thank Professor Andrew Sims for his feedback and en-
couragement during the development of this Comment, and my dearest Sara for her 
warmth, endless perspective and love throughout my time at Fordham Law. 
1  See generally WFUV 90.7 FM Public Radio from Fordham University in New York 
City, http://www.wfuv.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). 
2  See Robert J. Delchin, Musical Copyright Law: Past, Present and Future of Online 
Music Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 360–63 (2004); Gregory M. 
Prindle, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has Diminished Diversity and Sacri-
ficed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 302–21 (2003). 
3  See WFUV Public Radio—Support WFUV, http://www.wfuv.org/support/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). 
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commercial broadcasters to constantly cater to their advertising 
constituency.4  Perhaps it is also what allows WFUV to provide 
programming content the likes of which appeals to the interests of 
those for whom an appeal to the broadest number of people possi-
ble isn’t, for lack of a better word, appealing at all.  In my experi-
ence, WFUV has consistently programmed content in line with my 
existing musical interests, introduced me to a wide range of emerg-
ing talent and influenced my music purchasing and concert atten-
dance decisions with respect to both new and familiar artists. 
It was a welcome discovery then that I made, far from my bed-
room, in an old office cubicle without access to a radio, where I 
learned that I could receive WFUV broadcasts on my computer 
through the Internet.5  In an era of technological innovation 
marked by the emergence of Apple’s iPod and iTunes technology, 
I considered the new medium for the old format altogether fitting, 
appropriate and exciting.  Whereas the industry for the transmis-
sion of actual copies of music was undergoing massive reinven-
tion, it seemed logical that traditional radio should likewise benefit 
from and exploit the potential for growth through technology.  This 
was my introduction to “webcasting,” which refers to both “Inter-
net radio stations and online ‘simulcasts’ of terrestrial radio broad-
casts.”6  Within the broader universe of webcasters, WFUV quali-
4  See Delchin, supra note 2, at 360–63; Laura M. Holson, With By-the-Numbers Ra-
dio, Requests Are a Dying Breed, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06E1DA1230F932A25754C0A9649C
8B63. 
5  See WFUV Public Radio—WFUV On-Air: Listen Live, http://www.wfuv.org/ 
audio/stream.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). 
6  Recent Legislation, Copyright Law—Congress Responds to Copyright Arbitration 
Royalty Panel’s Webcasting Rates.—Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (to be Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114(F)–(G)), 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1920, 1920 n.2 (2003). “Unlike file-swapping services, through which users download 
copies of songs from other users, webcasts are ‘streamed’ and leave no useable copy on 
the listener's computer.” Id.  SoundExchange, Inc. (“SoundExchange”), the entity that 
collects certain royalties for broadcasts by webcasters, defines “[a] commercial web-
caster/broadcast simulcaster” as:   
a noninteractive, nonsubscription digital audio transmission service 
that provides audio programming consisting, in whole or in part, of 
performances of sound recordings, including retransmissions of 
broadcast transmissions.  The primary purpose of the service must be 
to provide audio or other entertainment programming and not to sell, 
advertise, or promote particular products or services other than sound 
recordings, live concerts, or other music-related events.  To be “non-
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fies as a “noncommercial webcaster.”7  Needless to say, my access 
to WFUV’s noncommercial programming through online stream-
ing has only enhanced my exposure to and appreciation both for 
the station, and, by extension, its featured artists. 
In March, 2007 the Copyright Royalty Board of the U.S. Copy-
right Office handed down “its decision on 2006–2010 royalties for 
the use of sound recordings when streaming music on the Internet 
by Internet radio stations and other non-interactive streaming ser-
vices operating under the statutory license.”8  “[U]nless there is a 
subsequent settlement or a successful appeal [of the Copyright 
Royalty Board’s decision,] royalty rates [for webcasting] are going 
to rise significantly over the next few years.”9  For instance, under 
the old rate, noncommercial radio entities paid a flat fee for 
 
interactive,” a service may not offer “on-demand” access to individ-
ual sound recordings or offer programs that are “specially created for 
the recipient.”  Playing requests does not make a service interactive 
provided that the service does not substantially consist of sound re-
cordings that are performed within one hour of the time they are re-
quested or at a designated time. 
SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “Service Provider” hyperlink 
under “Where Do I Start?” column; then follow “Commercial Webcasters/Simulcasters” 
hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 16, 2008). 
7  After providing the definition of a “commercial webcaster/broadcaster simulcaster,” 
see supra note 6, SoundExchange defines “[a] ‘noncommercial webcaster/broadcast 
simulcaster’” as:  
any webcaster/simulcaster that: 1. is exempt from taxation under sec-
tion 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. [§] 501); 2. 
has applied in good faith to the Internal Revenue Service for exemp-
tion from taxation under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code 
and has a commercially reasonable expectation that such exemption 
shall be granted; or 3. is operated by a State or possession or any 
governmental entity or subordinate thereof, or by the United States or 
District of Columbia, for exclusively public purposes. 
SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “Service Provider” hyperlink 
under “Where Do I Start?” column; then follow “Noncommercial Web-
casters/Simulcasters” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).  “WFUV is exempt . . . from 
Federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code.” 
WFUV-FM (A NONCOMMERCIAL, EDUCATIONAL FM STATION OWNED AND OPERATED BY 
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY), FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 6 (2007) (financial statements as of June 
30, 2006 and 2005, audited by KPMG), available at http://www.wfuv.org/ 
about/financials2005.pdf. 
8  David D. Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Releases Music Royalties for Internet 
Radio Streaming for 2006–2010—Clarifying the Confusion (June 20, 2007), 
http://www.dwt.com/practc/broadcast/bulletins/04-07_CRBDecision.htm [hereinafter 
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion]. 
9  Id. 
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streaming which permitted them to stream up to a capped number 
of hours.10  If they exceeded those hours, they paid a royalty rate 
that was one-third the rate at which commercial broadcasters were 
required to pay.11  “In the Board’s new decision, streaming [by 
noncommercial webcasters] in excess of the threshold would be 
paid at full commercial rates.”12  “Thus, by 2010, the royalties will 
be approximately nine times as high as they were in 2005” for non-
commercial webcasters who exceed the designated cap.13  Simply 
put, the dramatic rate increases imposed by the Copyright Royalty 
Board threaten the vitality of the Internet broadcasts of stations like 
WFUV, and countless other webcasters of comparable program-
ming, both commercial and noncommercial alike.14 
This Comment proposes to examine the propriety of the Copy-
right Royalty Board’s March 2007 rate determination proceeding 
for the performance of sound recordings by webcasters.  Part I in-
troduces the statutory and case law background leading up to the 
Copyright Royalty Board’s rate determination proceeding.  Part II 
outlines and critiques the Copyright Royalty Board’s March 2007 
Decision.  Part III proposes a solution to the difficulties posed by 
the Copyright Royalty Board’s rate determination, ultimately ad-
vising the legislature to consider reform of the statutory standards 
underlying the Copyright Royalty Board’s March 2007 Decision.  
Finally, an Addendum was added to this Comment to appraise the 
reader of major legislative developments on the subject matter ad-
10  Id. 
11  See id. 
12  See id. 
13  Id. (emphasis added). 
14  See, e.g., WFUV Public Radio—Streaming and Copyright Laws/Fees, 
http://www.wfuv.org/audio/copyright.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008); Celia Hirschman, 
Cloudy Issues Surround Internet Radio, On the Beat, KCRW (July 4, 2007), 
http://www.kcrw.com/etc/programs/ob/ob070704cloudy_issues_surrou; Posting by Eliot 
Van Buskirk to Wired Listening Post Blog, Pandora Could Be First Major Casualty of 
New Royalty Rates, http://blog.wired.com/music/2008/08/pandora-could-b.html (Aug. 18, 
2008, 01:32:03 PM); see also Hiawatha Bray, Internet Radio Firms Say Royalties  
Limiting Choices, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/ 
business/technology/articles/2008/03/14/internet_radio_firms_say_royalties_limiting_ 
choices; KCBX Public Radio, Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to 
Stream Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 16, 2008); SaveNetRadio, http://www.savenetradio.org/about/index.html (last 
visited Sep. 3, 2008).  
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dressed by this Comment that arose as the Comment was going to 
print. 
 
I. SLOW TRAIN COMING: THE EVOLUTION OF A PERFORMANCE 
RIGHT IN SOUND RECORDINGS 
A. The Historical Absence of a Sound Recording Performance 
Right 
The Copyright Act of 197615 sets out several broad types of 
“original works of authorship” that are entitled to copyright protec-
tion.16  Among these types of authorship are the closely related, 
but distinguishable categories of “musical works”17 and “sound re-
cordings.”18  “Copyright law affords each of these different aspects 
of music protection in recognition of the distinctive skills and indi-
viduality involved in their creation.”19  A “musical work” can be 
considered as the original melody, harmony, rhythm or lyrics of a 
composition, taken “individually or in combination.”20  The Copy-
right Act defines “[s]ound recordings” separately as “works that 
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other 
sounds . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in 
which they are embodied.”21  The copyright in the sound recording 
“does not attach to the underlying work per se, but only to the au-
15  Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 
(2006)) [hereinafter The Copyright Act].  
16  17 U.S.C. § 102; In the Matter of Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings 
and Ephemeral Recordings, Final Determination of Rates and Terms  
[hereinafter CRB Final Determination], 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380), available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-
1/final-rates-terms2005-1.pdf. 
17  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). 
18  Id. § 102(a)(7); see CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; see also 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (clarifying that the types of authorship are “illustrative and not limitative”). 
19  ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 424 (4th ed. Aspen Publishers 2006). 
20  Id. at 424–25; see CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666–67 (not-
ing that the Copyright Act does not specifically define the category of “musical works” 
because it is thought to have a “fairly settled meaning[]”).  
21  17 U.S.C. § 101.  Note however, that sounds that accompany a motion picture do not 
qualify as “sound recordings.” Id.  
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ral version of such work” in whatever medium the work is fix-
ated.22  So, for instance, a Frank Sinatra recording of a song writ-
ten by Cole Porter would implicate two copyrights: a musical work 
copyright for Mr. Porter’s underlying composition, and an entirely 
separate sound recording copyright for the specific fixation of 
sound that comprises Mr. Sinatra’s recording of Mr. Porter’s 
song.23  “[T]he musical composition copyright is typically owned 
by a musical publisher, while the sound recording copyright is 
typically owned by a record company.”24 
Copyright protection itself subsists in a veritable bundle of 
“exclusive rights” granted to the copyright owner.25  Among these 
is the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly,”26 typically 
referred to as the performance right.27  Originally the Copyright 
Act specified that the right of performance applied only to “liter-
ary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works . . . .”28  This enu-
meration of copyrightable works entitled to a performance right 
22  1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10[A][2] 
(MB 2008).  
23  See id. at n.23.  By extension, a separate recording of Mr. Porter’s song, say by Dean 
Martin, would make use of the same musical work, but result in a sound recording copy-
right entirely separate from that of Mr. Sinatra’s. See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 24,086.  To throw a further wrinkle into the equation “[o]nly sound recordings 
that were ‘fixed’ (i.e., first embodied in a phonorecord) on or after February 15, 1972, are 
eligible for statutory copyright.” 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.10 [A][1].  As such, the 
preceding hypotheticals presume sound recordings produced on or after the relevant date. 
24  1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:160 (West 2008); see CRB Final 
Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. 
25  17 U.S.C. § 106; see CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24086; MERGES ET 
AL., supra note 19, at 458.  
26  17 U.S.C. § 106(4).   
To perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means—(1) to perform . . . it at a 
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of 
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaint-
ances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a per-
formance . . . of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of 
the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the 
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different 
times.  
Id. § 101.   
27  See, e.g., CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; MERGES ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 498. 
28  17 U.S.C. § 106(4).  
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left a conspicuous absence.  “At its enactment in 1976, the Copy-
right Act was explicit in disallowing owners of sound recording 
copyrights from asserting any performance interest therein.”29 
This was no oversight.  By the time a sound recording copy-
right was created in 1972, radio broadcasters had enough political 
influence to persuade Congress to exclude sound recordings from 
claiming a performance right.30  This allowed broadcasters to 
avoid paying performance royalties for broadcasts31 of sound re-
cordings on top of the performance royalties they already had to 
pay to the owners of copyright in the underlying musical composi-
tions for broadcasts of their work.32  As a result, to return to our 
earlier example, when a traditional AM or FM radio station broad-
casts a post-1972 Frank Sinatra recording of a Cole Porter compo-
sition, only Mr. Porter receives a royalty as compensation for the 
performance.33  This is because, while Mr. Porter’s copyrighted 
musical work enjoys a performance right, Mr. Sinatra’s sound re-
cording copyright doe 34
Though seemingly lopsided, this arrangement prevailed largely 
due to its creation of a “symbiotic relationship” between broad-
casters and record labels.35  Record labels recognized that radio 
airtime was tantamount to free advertising for their sound re-
cordings, which helped drive customers to retail outlets to purchase 
29  2-8 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 8.14[A]. 
30  See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 566; see also William H. O’Dowd, The Need 
for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 249, 253–54 
(1994). 
31  The Copyright Act defines “[a] ‘broadcast’ transmission” as “a transmission made 
by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal Communications Com-
mission.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3).  As such, Internet radio transmissions are not considered 
broadcasts.  
32  See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 500.  In actuality, Mr. Porter’s publisher would 
most likely receive the royalty as owner of the copyright in his musical work. See supra 
note 24 and accompanying text.  Royalty payment to musical composition copyright 
owners is “typically handled through blanket licenses—permission to publicly perform an 
[sic] song from a vast catalog in exchange for a fee based on the scale of the business ac-
tivity—administered by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI), or Society of European Stage Authors and Com-
posers (SESAC).” MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 498 n.28. 
33  See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 498 n.28 and accompanying text. 
34  See 2-8 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 8.14[A]. 
35  See Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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albums.36  Broadcasters, on the other hand, enjoyed the listener-
ship these sound recordings brought their stations without the bur-
den of having to pay the record industry licensing fees for the per-
formance of its sound recording 37
B. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 
1995 
Record labels, deprived of a significant potential revenue 
stream, nevertheless tried repeatedly to secure a performance right 
for their copyrighted works.38  These efforts continuously failed to 
pass Congress.39  This effort reached a pitch in the mid-1990s, 
with the advent and increasing influence of digital technology and 
the Internet.40  “The advance of digital recording technology and 
the prospect of digital transmission capabilities created the possi-
bility that consumers would soon have access to services whereby 
they could pay for high quality digital audio transmissions (sub-
scription services) or even pay for specific songs to be played on 
demand (interactive services). 41
The proliferation of such services led to concern in the re-
cording industry that its “traditional balance . . . with . . . broad-
casters would be disturbed and that new, alternative paths for con-
sumers to purchase recorded music (in ways that cut out the 
recording industry’s products) would erode sales of recorded mu-
sic.”42  The recording industry responded by advocating for the 
36  See id. 
37  See id. at 488. 
38  See id. 
39  See id.; 4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 14:81 (noting failed attempts at legislative reform 
in 1969, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1991 and 1993). 
40  See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 566; Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 488. 
41  Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 488.  The Copyright Act itself defines a “‘subscription’ 
transmission” as “a transmission that is controlled and limited to particular recipients, and 
for which consideration is required to be paid or otherwise given by or on behalf of the 
recipient to receive the transmission or a package of transmissions including the trans-
mission.” 17 U.S.C. § 114 (j)(14) (2006).  In addition, the Copyright Act defines an “‘in-
teractive service’” as “one that enables a member of the public to receive a transmission 
of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particu-
lar sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by or on be-
half of the recipient.” Id. § 114(j)(7).  The Copyright Act’s definition of “interactive ser-
vices” does not generally include services that allow individuals “to request that 
particular sound recordings be performed.” Id. 
42  Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 488. 
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creation of a performance right that would apply exclusively to 
performances transmitted by way of these emerging digital tech-
nologies.43  Traditional broadcasters joined the recording industry 
in supporting the creation of such a right because it would “impose 
a new licensing requirement (and cost) upon potential new com-
petitors.”44  The fledgling Internet music industry lacked the mas-
sive political clout that traditional broadcasters had wielded in suc-
cessfully opposing a performance right for sound recordings.45  
Congress, however, “sought to ensure that the new right would not 
unduly interfere with the development of new digital transmission 
business models.”46  The resulting compromise was the creation, at 
long last, of a performance right for sound recordings, albeit a lim-
ited one.47  In 1995, the Digital Performance Right in Sound Re-
cordings Act (“DPRA”),48 amended the Copyright Act by adding 
section 106(6) which gave the owners of sound recording copy-
rights the exclusive right to perform their sound recordings “pub-
licly by means of a digital audio transmission.”49  In essence, this 
provision created a “digital performance right.”50 
To qualify for this exclusive right, a performance of a sound 
recording essentially needs to meet three requirements: it “must be 
(a) in digital form, (b) audio-only, and (c) a transmission.”51  With 
regards to the first requirement, “[a] ‘digital transmission’ is a 
transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other non-analog 
format.”52  Effectively this maintains the status quo; a broadcast of 
a sound recording on traditional AM or FM radio still does not 
constitute a compensable performance under the Copyright Act af-
43  See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 566–67.  
44  Id. 
45  See id. at 567; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
46  MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 567. 
47  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).  
48  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 
109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  
49  17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006). 
50  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.  
51  Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery, 20 (4) 
ENT. L. REP. 4 (Sept. 1998). 
52  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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ter the enactment of the DPRA.53  Secondly, the requirement that 
the transmission be “audio-only” intimates that no visual content 
accompany the transmission of sound, as, for instance, occurs in a 
music video.54  This is because such works already have a per-
formance right under the Copyright Act.55  Finally, with respect to 
the requirement that the performance be a “transmission,”56 the 
Copyright Act provides that “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance . . . is to 
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or 
sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.”57  
Effectively then, “rendering a live performance” of a digital sound 
recording in a single location through “the use of a megaphone or 
loudspeakers”58 would not constitute a “digital audio transmis-
sion.”59 
The DPRA did not, however, extend the digital performance 
right to all types of digital audio transmissions.60  The legislation 
itself was intended as “a narrowly crafted response” to concerns 
expressed by the recording industry “namely that certain types of 
subscription and interaction audio services might adversely affect 
sales of sound recordings and erode copyright owners’ ability to 
control and be paid for use of their work.”61  Indeed, the digital 
performance right was “limited by the creation of a statutory li-
cense for certain non-exempt, non-interactive subscription ser-
vices” as well as for “preexisting satellite digital audio radio ser-
vices” both of which make use of digital audio transmissions.62  
These are what the Copyright Act presently defines as “preexisting 
53  See Kohn, supra note 51.  Moreover, “[t]raditional television and radio broadcasters 
may continue to perform sound recordings without being subject to this new [perform-
ance] right, even if they convert their signal to digital form.” MERGES ET AL., supra note 
19, at 567 n.33; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1). 
54  Kohn, supra note 51. 
55  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (providing the exclusive right of performance to owners of 
copyright in “audiovisual works”); Kohn, supra note 51. 
56  Kohn, supra note 51. 
57  17 U.S.C. § 101.  
58  Kohn, supra note 51. 
59  17 U.S.C. § 106(6); see also id. § 114(j)(5). 
60  See Kohn, supra note 51 (explaining that the provisions of the DPRA did not in-
clude webcasting); see also 4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 14:29. 
61  H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995) (emphasis added). 
62  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 380).  
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subscription services”63 and “preexisting satellite digital radio ser-
vices.”64 
The statutory license essentially allows these services to make 
their digital audio transmissions without directly having to obtain 
“consent from, or having to negotiate license fees with, copyright 
owners of the sound recordings they perform.”65  To achieve these 
ends, “Congress established procedures to facilitate voluntary ne-
gotiation of rates and terms including a provision authorizing 
copyright owners and services to designate common agents on a 
nonexclusive basis—as well as to pay, to collect, and to distribute 
royalties—and a provision granting antitrust immunity for such ac-
tions.”66  This provision eventually led to the creation of SoundEx-
change, Inc. (“SoundExchange”), the “independent, nonprofit per-
formance rights organization that is designated by the U.S. 
Copyright Office to collect and distribute digital performance roy-
alties” for all digital audio transmissions of sound recordings, as 
well as to participate in rate-setting proceedings.67 
If voluntary negotiations between sound recording copyright 
owners or their designated agents and the subscription services 
failed to yield agreement, “the Librarian of Congress was directed 
63  17 U.S.C. § 114 (j)(11).  “A ‘preexisting subscription service’ is a service that per-
forms sound recordings by means of noninteractive audio-only subscription digital audio 
transmissions, which was in existence and was making such transmissions to the public 
for a fee on or before July 31, 1998 . . . .” Id.  This would include, for example, the ser-
vice Music Choice, which transmits programmed music on channels received by digital 
cable network subscribers. See generally Music Choice, http://www.musicchoice.com 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2008); see also 4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 14:94. 
64  17 U.S.C. § 114 (j)(10).  “A ‘preexisting satellite digital audio radio service’ is a 
subscription satellite digital audio radio service provided pursuant to a satellite digital 
audio radio service license issued by the Federal Communications Commission on or be-
fore July 31, 1998 . . . .” Id.  This includes XM and Sirius Satellite Radio services, which 
allow paying subscribers to receive a variety of audio content, including extensive music 
programming, by way of digital satellite transmission. See generally XM Satellite Radio, 
http://www.xmradio.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); Sirius Satellite Radio, 
http://www.sirius.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
65  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. 
66  Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(e) (“Notwithstanding any provision of the antitrust 
laws . . . copyright owners of sound recordings and any entities performing sound re-
cordings . . . may negotiate and agree upon the royalty rates and license terms and condi-
tions for the performance of such sound recordings . . . .”). 
67  SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “About” hyperlink under 
column to the right; then follow “Background” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); see 
4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 14:96. 
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to convene a Copyright Arbitration Panel (“CARP”) to recommend 
royalty rates and terms” for digital performances of sound re-
cordings.68  In determining the appropriate royalty rates “for the 
subscription services’ statutory license,” Congress provided that 
the CARP should set out to achieve “the policy objectives in sec-
tion 801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act” (“801(b)(1) standard”).69  In 
effect then, the CARP would be asked to set royalty rates that seek: 
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works 
to the public. 
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for 
his or her creative work and the copyright user a fair 
income under existing economic conditions. 
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright 
owner and the copyright user in the product made 
available to the public with respect to relative crea-
tive contribution, technological contribution, capital 
investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the open-
ing of new markets for creative expression and me-
dia for their communication. 
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the struc-
ture of the industries involved and on generally pre-
vailing industry practices.70 
After the CARP made its determination of rates, it was to rec-
ommend its determination to the Librarian of Congress, who, on 
the advice of the Register of Copyrights, was free to either reject or 
accept the decision of the CARP.71  In the event of a rejection, the 
Librarian was to substitute his own determination of rates based 
upon the record of the arbitration.72  Once the final rate determina-
tion was set, under the DPRA copyright owners were to allocate 
68  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. 
69  Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 114.  
70  17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)–(D). 
71  Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings [hereinafter Webcaster I LoC Determination], 67 
Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,242 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261). 
72  Id. 
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half “of the statutory licensing royalties that they receive from the 
subscriptions services to [sound] recording artists.”73 
While the DPRA set out extensive provisions for the licensing 
of the digital performance right of sound recordings by subscrip-
tion services, the DPRA did not address digital audio transmissions 
made by nonsubscription,74 noninteractive services75 such as web-
casting.76  Technology continued to evolve rapidly.  In 1995, the 
year the DPRA was passed, software developer Progressive Net-
works released RealAudio, “the first technology for streaming au-
dio” content over the Internet.77  The technology greatly facilitated 
the rise and proliferation of webcasting, “since anyone with a per-
sonal computer could set up their own Internet ‘radio station,’ and 
anyone with free RealAudio software could tune in.”78  While non-
interactive “pure webcasting” was not covered by the DPRA, some 
websites began offering users customized content based on indi-
vidual preference, as well as archived webcasts on demand.79  
These sites began to call into question what exactly qualifies as a 
noninteractive service.80  As a whole, webcasters maintained that 
their noninteractive, nonsubscription services were not subject to 
the digital performance right under the DPRA.81 
The recording industry, however, perhaps frustrated by the 
limitations of the DPRA, countered with a different position.82  
73  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. 
74  The Copyright Act simply defines a “‘nonsubscription’ transmission” as “any trans-
mission that is not a subscription transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(9); see also 17 U.S.C. 
§ 114(j)(14) (defining a subscription service); supra text accompanying note 41.  
75  The Copyright Act does not offer an independent definition of “noninteractive ser-
vices.” See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j); see also id. at § 114(j)(7) (defining an “interactive ser-
vice”); supra text accompanying note 41. 
76  See Kohn, supra note 51; 4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 1:104 (explaining that the 
DPRA didn’t apply to webcasters); see also Recent Legislation, supra note 6, at 1920 
n.2.; supra text accompanying note 6 (defining webcasts as “noninteractive, nonsubscrip-
tion” services); Steve Gordon, Update on Webcasting Royalty Rates Part I of II,  
ENT. L. & FIN., August, 2004, available at http://www.stevegordonlaw.com/ 
update_webcast_royalty_rates.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
77  Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution is Ready to Begin, as Soon as 
We Figure Out The Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (2001).  
78  Delchin, supra note 2, at 354. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id.; see also Craft, supra note 77, at 12. 
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The Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), the 
U.S. recording industry’s trade association,83 argued that web-
casters were indeed subject to the DPRA’s digital performance 
right, and as such should be paying royalties for the performance 
of its copyrighted material on the Internet.84 
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Around the same time that the RIAA was arguing that web-
casters were subject to the DPRA’s digital performance right, 
Congress was in the middle of drafting the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”),85 primarily aimed at bringing the U.S. 
Copyright Act into harmony with World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization treaties concerning “Internet piracy and security.”86  
The recording industry sought to take advantage of the opportu-
nity, intensely lobbying Congress to add language to the Copyright 
Act that would eliminate any uncertainty as to whether noninterac-
tive, nonsubscription webcasting was subject to the digital per-
formance right.87  The recording industry backed its bark with bite, 
threatening litigation and vowing to withhold its copyrighted con-
tent if Congress declined to insert such revisions into the Copyright 
Act.88 
“In an effort to appease the RIAA, Congress permitted a last-
minute hearing on the matter.”89  The prominent players in the 
equation were hastily gathered in 1998.90  The Digital Media As-
sociation (“DiMA”), digital media’s recently formed trade associa-
tion, represented webcasters.91  “On Thursday, July 23, 1998” the 
RIAA and DiMA “met with the U.S. Copyright Office . . . and 
were told by the Register of Copyrights that they had until the fol-
lowing Friday, July 31, 1998, to draft the legislation” that the 
83  RIAA—Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).  
84  Kohn, supra note 51. 
85  Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L.  No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
86  Craft, supra note 77, at 13.  
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  See id. at 12; see also Kohn, supra note 51. 
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RIAA was seeking.92  DiMA found itself in a difficult position.  
Even if DiMA was able to defeat the legislative amendment pro-
posed by the RIAA, it would still be subject to the RIAA’s threat-
ened litigation, which, at the very least would impose a huge cost 
on the growing industry.93  “Therefore, instead of fighting the 
amendment, DiMA negotiated a simpler compulsory licensing 
process—paying royalties to a single entity, [eventually to become 
SoundExchange] and not having to negotiate individually with 
each individual copyright holder.”94  In somewhat miraculous 
fashion, “on August 4, 1998, the House of Representatives passed 
an amendment to the [DMCA] which included the legislation 
drafted and agreed upon by the RIAA and DiMA just days, and 
perhaps hours, earlier.”95  The “eleventh hour” amendment, made 
it into the DMCA “without House or Senate debate,” and was 
signed into law by President Clinton in Octo 96
Under the DMCA the scope of the DPRA’s digital perform-
ance right was broadened to include “digital transmissions and re-
transmissions, typically referred to as webcasting.”97  However, 
the DMCA also expanded the “statutory license for digital audio 
transmission of sound recordings.”98  Under the DMCA, web-
casters who “transmit/retransmit sound recordings on an interac-
tive basis” are ineligible for statutory licensing and have to directly 
“obtain the consent of, and negotiate fees with, individual owners” 
of sound recordings.99  On the other hand, the DMCA provided 
that webcasters who stream digital audio transmissions on a non-
subscription, noninteractive basis would be “eligible for statutory 
licensing”100 much as “non-interactive, subscription services and 
preexisting satellite digital audio radio services” were under the 
DPRA.101  In essence then, by enacting the DMCA Congress cre-
92  Kohn, supra note 51. 
93  Delchin, supra note 2, at 357. 
94  Id. 
95  Kohn, supra note 51. 
96  Craft, supra note 77, at 15; see Delchin, supra note 2, at 357. 
97  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).  
98  Id.; see also 1 PATRY, supra note 24, § 1:104 (explaining that the DMCA expanded 
the provisions of the DPRA to include webcasters). 
99  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. 
100  Id. 
101  Id.; see supra text accompanying note 60. 
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ated a new “statutory license” in § 114 of the Copyright Act for a 
distinct group of digital audio transmissions: “‘eligible non-
subscription transmissions,’ which include[s] non-interactive 
transmissions of sound recordings by webcasters” (“§ 114 web-
caster performance license”).102  In order to qualify for this statu-
tory license, “the webcaster must comply with several” distinct 
technical requirements.103 
To determine rates for the webcaster’s statutory license, the 
DMCA “adopted the . . . voluntary negotiation and arbitration pro-
102  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2), 114(f)(2) 
(2006). 
103  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.  A laundry list of these require-
ments provides:  
(1) Webcasters must adhere to the “sound recording performance 
complement” originally established under the DPRA.  This prohibits 
a webcaster from playing in any three-hour period more than three 
songs from the same album and more than two songs consecutively, 
or more than four different songs from the same artist or from any 
compilation.  (2) The song, album, and featured artist must be textu-
ally identified on the user's software program while the song is being 
played; however, (3) advanced song or artist playlists may not be 
published.  DJs can use “teasers” to identify which artists will be 
played, but they cannot specify the time a particular song will be 
played.  (4) If the program is archived on the webcaster's website and 
made on-demand, it must be at least five hours in duration.  The ra-
tionale [being] that a user is not willing to sit through a five hour re-
broadcast in order to hear a particular song repeated again.  Also, the 
archive may be made available only for a period of two weeks.  (5) If 
the program is continuously looped (i.e., immediately re-played upon 
conclusion), it must be at least three hours in duration.  This makes it 
more difficult to repeatedly tune in to particular songs. (6) Scheduled 
programs (i.e., songs announced in advance) of less than one hour in 
duration can only be transmitted three times in any two-week period, 
or four times for programs longer than one hour in duration.  (7) The 
webcaster cannot suggest a connection in any way between the artist 
and any particular product or service (i.e., deceptive advertising).  For 
example, the same advertisement displayed every time a particular 
song is played may suggest a misleading connection.  (8) Webcasters 
have to take proactive steps to defeat copyright infringement if they 
are aware of such copying and have the technological capacity to 
prevent it, such as disabling copying features available through the 
service.  (9) A webcaster may not intentionally switch channels from 
one program to another.  For example, if a user is listening to one 
genre of music, the webcaster is prohibited from switching the chan-
nel to another genre. 
Delchin, supra note 2, at 358–59. 
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cedures” established under the DPRA for satellite and subscription 
services.104  Thus, if the interested parties were unable to voluntar-
ily agree on a licensing fee for webcasting, the CARP, once again, 
was to be convened to determine and recommend to the Librarian 
of Congress a fair value for these services.105  Significantly, how-
ever, while the DMCA left the DPRA’s rate setting procedure in 
place, “it changed the statutory standard for determining rates and 
terms.”106  Rather than seeking to achieve the policy objectives ar-
ticulated in the 801(b)(1) standard, in setting the statutory license 
rate for webcasting, the CARP was to determine what “most 
clearly represents the rates and terms that would have been negoti-
ated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller” (“willing buyer/willing seller standard”).107  “The criteria 
for setting rates and terms for the § 114 webcaster performance li-
cense [were] enunciated under 17 U.S.C. [§] 114(f)(2)(B),” which 
presently, in slightly amended form provides: 
Such rates and terms shall distinguish among the 
different types of eligible nonsubscription transmis-
sion services then in operation and shall include a 
minimum fee for each such type of service, such 
differences to be based on criteria including, but not 
limited to, the quantity and nature of the use of 
sound recordings and the degree to which use of the 
service may substitute for or may promote the pur-
chase of phonorecords by consumers. In establish-
ing rates and terms for transmissions by eligible 
nonsubscription services and new subscription ser-
vices, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall establish 
rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates 
and terms that would have been negotiated in the 
marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller. In determining such rates and terms, the 
Copyright Royalty Judges shall base its decision on 
104  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; see supra text accompanying 
notes 60–73. 
105  See Delchin, supra note 2, at 358; 17 U.S.C. § 114(e), 114(f). 
106  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086 (emphasis added). 
107  17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B); see CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. 
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economic, competitive and programming informa-
tion presented by the parties, including— 
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for or 
may promote the sales of phonorecords or otherwise 
may interfere with or may enhance the sound re-
cording copyright owner’s other streams of revenue 
from its sound recordings; and 
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the 
transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and the 
service made available to the public with respect to 
relative creative contribution, technological contri-
bution, capital investment, cost, and risk.108 
Congress further provided that “[i]n establishing such rates and 
terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges may consider the rates and 
terms for comparable types of digital audio transmission services 
and comparable circumstances under voluntary license agree-
ments.”109 
“Congress also recognized that webcasters who avail them-
selves of the [§] 114 webcaster performance license may need to 
make one or more temporary or ‘ephemeral’ copies of a sound re-
cording in order to facilitate the transmission of that recording.”110  
This involves the right of reproduction, an entirely different exclu-
sive right than the right of performance,111 which essentially pro-
vides the owner of a copyrighted work the exclusive right to make 
a copy of that work.112  Unlike the right of performance, sound re-
cordings, subject to a few enumerated exceptions, “enjoy the full 
scope of the reproduction right” under the Copyright Act.113  “Ac-
cordingly Congress created a new statutory license in [§] 112(e)” 
for copies of sound recordings that webcasters may have to make 
in the process of webcasting (“§ 112 ephemeral license”).114  
“Congress retained the DPRA voluntary negotiation and arbitration 
108  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
114(f)(2)(B)).  
109  17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B). 
110  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. 
111  See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 500. 
112  Id. at 459.  
113  4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 11:18. 
114  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; 17 U.S.C. § 112(e).  
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procedures for the § 112 ephemeral license.  Congress again ap-
plied the willing buyer/willing seller standard applicable to the § 
114 webcaster performance license.  The webcasting and ephem-
eral statutory licenses created by the DMCA [were] the subject” of 
the March, 2007 decision that is the focus of this Comment.115 
D. Webcaster I 
The two licenses created by the DMCA were the subject of one 
prior proceeding (“Webcaster I”).116  Twenty-six webcasters were 
able to reach voluntary licensing agreements with the RIAA in the 
wake of the DMCA.117  In July, 1999, the RIAA petitioned the Li-
brarian of Congress to convene a CARP to determine “industry-
wide rates for webcasters with whom it had not yet completed 
agreements.”118  The CARP released its determination three years 
later.119  In the interim, National Public Radio (“NPR”), which had 
litigated on behalf of public radio in Webcaster I, reached a volun-
tary settlement agreement with the RIAA, which covered all NPR 
member and Corporation for Public Broadcasting (“CPB”) quali-
fied webcasters through 2004.120  The NPR settlement did not ap-
ply to the remaining non-CPB affiliated noncommercial web-
115  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086–87.  While the language of the § 
114 webcaster’s performance license and the § 112 ephemeral license “varies in minor 
respects . . . the criteria for setting rates and terms [are] essentially identical.” Id. at 
24,087–88.  
116  Id. at 24,087; Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261). 
117  Recent Legislation, supra note 6, at 1922; see Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,107, 52,108 (Sept. 27, 1999).  
118  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 64 Fed. 
Reg. at 52,108. 
119  Id.; In the Matter of Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound  
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Report of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty 
Panel [hereinafter Webcaster I CARP Report] (Feb. 20, 2002), 
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates.pdf. 
120  KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream Mu-
sic Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Aug. 16, 
2008); see Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,258.  “A non-CPB, non-
commercial broadcaster is a Public Broadcasting Entity as defined in 17 U.S.C. [§] 
118(g) that is not qualified to receive funding from the Corporation for Public Broadcast-
ing pursuant to the criteria set forth in 47 U.S.C. [§] 396.” Webcaster I LoC Determina-
tion, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,243 n.12. 
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casters in the proceedings, and hence the CARP was left to deter-
mine a rate for these services.121 
Recognizing the “extraordinary challenge” of setting a rate for 
noncommercial webcasters under the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard, the CARP noted that “[a]pplying the same commercial 
broadcaster rate to non-commercial entities affronts common 
sense.”122  At the RIAA’s proposal, the CARP reluctantly agreed 
to subject noncommercial webcasters to a per-performance of 
copyrighted material rate123 that was one-third the rate set for 
commercial webcasters, the alternative being to subject noncom-
mercial webcasters to full commercial rates.124  Hence, whereas 
the CARP recommended that commercial webcasters pay at a rate 
of 0.07¢ per-performance, the CARP also recommended that non-
commercial entities pay one-third that rate, or 0.02¢ per-
performance, rounded to the nearest h 125
In his review of the CARP’s decision (“Webcaster I LoC De-
termination”), the Librarian of Congress revised some of the 
CARP’s findings.126  Whereas the CARP had suggested a distinc-
tion between webcasts that were Internet-only transmissions and 
webcasts that were merely broadcast radio retransmissions, the Li-
brarian of Congress rejected this distinction, and concluded that 
both of these types of transmissions should be subject to the same 
121  See Webcaster I CARP Report, supra note 119, at 89.  
122  Id.  
123  Per-performance, “i.e. [requiring] a payment for each song as heard by 
each listener.” Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.  “A performance is de-
fined as a single song, heard by a single listener.  Thus, if a webcaster streams 10 songs 
in an hour to a single listener, there have been 10 performances during that period.  If 
there were two listeners to those 10 songs, there would have been 20 performances.” Id. 
124  Webcaster I CARP Report, supra note 119, at 93.  
125  Id.  This rate was essentially for non-commercial broadcaster’s “simulcasts” or 
Internet retransmissions of AM/FM broadcasts. Id.  Furthermore, whereas the CARP had 
recommended that commercial entities be charged a higher rate for webcast transmissions 
of Internet only content (0.14¢ per-performance), the CARP likewise recommended that 
noncommercial entities be charged one-third of this adjusted rate (0.05¢ per-
performance) for its transmissions of Internet only content, namely archived webcasts, 
and the operation of up to two Internet-only side channels. Id. at 93–94.  Any additional 
side channels the noncommercial webcaster may host would be subject to the full com-
mercial non-radio simulcast rate of 0.14¢ per performance. Id. at 94. 
126  See Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,259 (July 8, 2002) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261). 
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webcasting rate.127  However, in essence the Librarian of Congress 
adopted much of the CARP’s recommendations with regard to 
transmissions made by noncommercial stations, setting the web-
casting rate for the noncommercial entities at one-third that of their 
commercial counterparts.128 
Many small commercial webcasters felt that the rates ulti-
mately set by the Librarian of Congress were too high.  The CARP 
had set its rates using a willing buyer/willing seller model based 
largely on a settlement agreement between Yahoo! and the RIAA, 
whereby Yahoo! paid the RIAA a lump sum of $1.25 million for 
its first one and a half billion transmissions.129  Although the Li-
brarian of Congress set rates that were on the whole lower than 
what the CARP had recommended, he, like the CARP, also made 
the questionable assumption “that a voluntary rate agreement be-
tween RIAA and one of the largest webcasters in the market would 
also be appropriate for the smallest webcasters in the market.”130  
In reality, however, small commercial webcasters have a much 
lower per-performance revenue than do large commercial web-
casters, such as Yahoo!.131  As a result, small commercial web-
casters began shutting down in droves after the Librarian of Con-
gress’ determination in Webcaster I.132  Many small commercial 
webcasters, however, also began complaining to Congress, and 
127  See Delchin, supra note 2, at 376.  
128  See Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,259.  The Librarian thus 
adopted the CARP’s recommendations for a 0.02¢ per performance rate for Internet si-
mulcasts of noncommercial radio broadcasts. Id.  However, since the Librarian of Con-
gress had done away with the CARP’s distinction between Internet-only webcasts and 
webcasts that were merely retransmissions of radio broadcasts, it likewise did away with 
the CARP’s recommendation of a higher rate for the latter, and subjected both of these 
transmissions to a 0.07¢ per performance rate for commercial entities. Id.  By extension, 
noncommercial stations were subject to a downward adjustment from the CARP’s rec-
ommendation of 0.05¢ per performance of Internet-only content (archived webcasts and 
up to two side channels) to a rate of 0.02¢ per performance of Internet-only content, 
again one-third of the 0.07¢ per performance rate for commercial entities for the same 
services. Id. 
129  Delchin, supra note 2, at 376.  
130  Id. at 377. 
131  See id. 
132  See id. Many noncommercial stations also stopped streaming after Webcaster I as 
well. See Public Stations Now Offline, RADIO & INTERNET NEWSL., Aug. 8, 2002, 
http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/080802/index.shtml. 
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noncommercial webcasters, not entirely satisfied by the Librarian 
of Congress’ ultimate determination, joined the chorus.133 
E. The Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 
Congress was swift in action, responding to concerns by pass-
ing the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 (“SWSA”).134  
“The SWSA provide[d] temporary relief to noncommercial web-
casters and small webcasters”135 and was met with general ap-
proval from both sides of the debate.136  The SWSA itself did not 
set rates or terms for webcasting entities.137  Rather the SWSA au-
thorized SoundExchange, acting on behalf of the RIAA, and an 
agent of the Librarian of Congress to enter into “agreements, on 
behalf of all copyright owners and performers for the purpose of 
establishing an alternative payment structure for small commercial 
webcasters and noncommercial webcasters operating under” the § 
112 [ephemeral] license and the § 114 webcaster performance li-
cense.138  To achieve these ends, the SWSA provided that any roy-
alty rates and terms reached in such agreements “shall be consid-
ered as a compromise motivated by the unique business, economic 
and political contributions of small webcasters rather than as mat-
ters that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller.”139  However, the rates and 
terms of agreements made under the SWSA were to apply only to 
133  See Emily D. Harwood, Note, Staying Afloat in the Internet Stream: How to Keep 
Web Radio from Drowning in Digital Copyright Royalties, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 673, 687 
(2004); KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream 
Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Aug. 
16, 2008); Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.  Although the Librarian of 
Congress set noncommercial rates at one-third that of commercial entities, noncommer-
cial stations were in fact seeking a rate that was one-thirty fourth of that for commercial 
entities. Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,258. 
134  Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see Recent Legislation, supra 
note 6, at 1924. 
135  Matt Jackson, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law and Streaming Media, 
11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 469 (2003). 
136  Kurt Hanson, Congress Passes SWSA!, RADIO & INTERNET NEWSL., Nov. 15, 2002, 
v.2, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/111502/index.shtml. 
137  Delchin, supra note 2, at 377. 
138  Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 68 
Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,008 (June 11, 2003) (emphasis added). 
139  Id. at 35,009 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5)(C)). 
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the time periods specified in those agreements and were to be 
given no precedential effect in any future rate-setting proceed-
ings.140  While nothing compelled the RIAA to come to new 
agreements with webcasters under the terms of the SWSA, if no 
agreements were reached the rates set by the Librarian of Congress 
would take effect.141 
 Significantly for small commercial entities, the SWSA pro-
vided that any agreement with small webcasters must include a 
provision allowing these entities to pay royalties on a percentage of 
revenue or percentage of expenses basis, rather than on a per-
performance basis.142  Also with regards to both small webcasters 
and noncommercial webcasters, the SWSA provided a “grace pe-
riod for back payment of royalties . . . .”143  Under these circum-
stances small webcasters were able to reach an agreement with 
SoundExchange in December of 2002.144  The agreement for small 
webcasters reached under the SWSA, defined a small webcaster on 
a revenue scale graduated by calendar year.145  Under the most re-
cent definition, a small webcaster is one whose revenues do not 
exceed $1.25 million a year.146  As for rates, the most recent provi-
sions of the SWSA provide that an eligible small webcaster must 
pay ten percent of its first $250,000 in gross revenues and twelve 
percent of any gross revenues beyond that in a given year.147  
However, in the event that a small webcaster were to earn “little or 
no revenue, a percentage of expenses (seven percent) would be 
paid as a minimum fee if that figure exceeded the applicable per-
centage of revenues.”148  “In addition, [under the SWSA] each 
[small] webcaster is required to maintain and provide arduous and 
140  Id. at 35,008. 
141  Delchin, supra note 2, at 378.  
142  See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, sec. 4, § 114(f), 
116 Stat. 2780, 2781–82; Delchin, supra note 2, at 378.  
143  Delchin, supra note 2, at 378; see Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-321, sec. 3(a)(1), (b)(1), § 114, 116 Stat. 2780, 2781.  
144  See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 
67 Fed. Reg. 78,510 (Dec. 24, 2002), available at http://www.copyright.gov/ 
fedreg/2002/67fr78510.html; Delchin, supra note 2, at 379.  
145  See Delchin, supra note 2, at 379. 
146  See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 
67 Fed. Reg. at 78,513. 
147  See id. at 78,511. 
148  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8; see Delchin, supra note 2, at 379. 
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extensive notice and recordkeeping regarding the songs that they 
broadcast.”149 
With regards to noncommercial webcasters, the SWSA fore-
stalled the payment of royalties due for the period between October 
29, 1998 and May 31, 2003 until June 20, 2003.150  With the 
breathing room afforded by this grace period, noncommercial 
webcasters and SoundExchange were able to reach an agreement 
as to royalty rates under the SWSA on June 2, 2003.151  Under the 
agreement, noncommercial webcasters transmitting a single chan-
nel, be it a retransmission of a radio broadcast or an Internet-only 
transmission, paid a flat minimum annual fee starting at $200, es-
calating per year up to $500 most recently.152  Noncommercial 
webcasters transmitting more than a single channel have always 
had to pay a minimum fee of $500 under the agreement.153  The 
flat minimum fee covered broadcasts by noncommercial web-
casters up to a cap, designated at 146,000 Aggregate Tuning 
Hours154 (“ATH”) in any month.155  After that cap was exceeded, 
149  Delchin, supra note 2, at 379. 
150  See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, sec. 3(a)(1), § 
114, 116 Stat. 2780, 2781. 
151  See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 
68 Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,009 (June 11, 2003).  
152  See id. at 35,010.  However, under the most recent rates a noncommercial webcaster, 
substantially all of whose programming can “reasonably [be] classified as news, talk, 
sports or business programming,” need only pay a minimum annual fee of $250. Id. 
153  See id. 
154  The agreement defines the term Aggregate Tuning Hours as follows: 
The term “Aggregate Tuning Hours” means the total hours of pro-
gramming that a Noncommercial Webcaster has transmitted during 
the relevant period to all listeners within the United States over the 
relevant channels or stations, and from any archived programs, that 
provide audio programming consisting, in whole or in part, of eligible 
nonsubscription transmissions, less the actual running time of any 
sound recordings for which the Noncommercial Webcaster has ob-
tained direct licenses apart from 17 U.S.C. [§] 114(d)(2) or which do 
not require a license under United States copyright law.  By way of 
example, if a Noncommercial Webcaster transmitted 1 hour of pro-
gramming to 10 simultaneous listeners, the Noncommercial Web-
caster’s Aggregate Tuning Hours would equal 10.  If three minutes of 
that hour consisted of transmission of a directly licensed recording, 
the Noncommercial Webcaster’s Aggregate Tuning Hours would 
equal 9 hours and 30 minutes.  As an additional example, if one lis-
tener listened to a Noncommercial Webcaster for 10 hours (and none 
of the recordings transmitted during that time was directly licensed), 
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noncommercial broadcasters were subject to a rate of 0.02¢ per-
performance,156 which, again, was one-third the rate for commer-
cial broadcasters.157  A noncommercial webcaster operating more 
than three channels of programming, however, was subject to pay 
for the performance of sound recordings on those channels at full 
commercial rates.158  Furthermore, the agreement removed “the 
arduous recordkeeping requirements established under [the] 
CARP”159 by permitting noncommercial webcasters to avoid these 
requirements by paying a fee between $25 and $50 a year.160  This 
saved noncommercial webcasters a potentially much larger ex-
pense.161 
In light of the CARP and Librarian of Congress’ determina-
tions, “most noncommercial broadcasters regarded the agreement 
[reached under the SWSA] as a victory in keeping streams from 
shutting down.”162  Indeed, in 2002 most small webcasters and 
noncommercial groups felt that webcasting royalties would have 
“put them out of business . . . if not for the [SWSA].”163  The terms 
of the agreements, reached under the SWSA determined rates for 
small and noncommercial webcasters through December 31, 2005, 
the last day prior to the beginning of the period covered by the 
March 2007 rate proceedings that are the focus of this Com-
ment.164 
 
the Noncommercial Webcaster’s Aggregate Tuning Hours would 
equal 10. 
Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 35,012. 
155  See id. at 35,010.   
156  See id.  Alternatively, the agreement allowed noncommercial webcasters to elect to 
pay a rate of 0.251¢ per ATH. Id. 
157  See Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
158  See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 
68 Fed. Reg. at 35,011.  
159  Delchin, supra note 2, at 382. 
160  See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 
68 Fed. Reg. at 35,010. 
161  Delchin, supra note 2, at 382. 
162  Id. 
163  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
164  Although the SWSA, as originally drafted, was only meant to cover the period from 
1998 to 2004, the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 extended the 
provisions of the SWSA an extra year to cover through the end of 2005. See Copyright 
Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, sec. 6(b)(3), § 118, 
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F. Formation of the Copyright Royalty Board 
In the time during which the SWSA has been in effect, how-
ever, the rate setting procedure for the § 114 webcaster perform-
ance license and the § 112 ephemeral license has undergone sig-
nificant reform.165  After Webcaster I and other proceedings 
calling for the formation of a CARP, many parties offered criti-
cisms of the CARP arbitration system, primarily that: “[(1)] CARP 
decisions are unpredictable and inconsistent[; (2)] [a]rbitrators lack 
appropriate expertise to render decisions and frequently reflect ei-
ther a ‘content’ or ‘user’ bias [; and  (3)] [t]he process is unneces-
sarily expensive.”166  In response to these concerns Congress 
passed the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 
(“Reform Act”), which replaced the copyright arbitration royalty 
panels with three full-time, government-paid Copyright Royalty 
Judges, appointed by the Librarian of Congress.167  The three 
judges collectively constitute the Copyright Royalty Board 
(“CRB”).168  “The royalty judges are ‘housed’ in the Library of 
Congress, and after initial staggered appointments . . . serve for six 
years, with the possibility of reappointment.”169  Rate setting pro-
cedures after the Reform Act maintain “the voluntary negotiation 
period that existed under the CARP system.”170  However, if 
“copyright users and carriers cannot settle on the rates or methods 
to distribute royalties in private negotiations,” then under the Re-
form Act, the “three full-time Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) 
 
118 Stat. 2341, 2370–71; CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,106 (May 1, 
2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
165  See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 
118 Stat. 2341 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
166  H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 18 (2004).  Parties to CARP arbitration proceedings had 
to pay the costs of the arbitrators themselves. Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra 
note 8.  
167  See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 
118 Stat. 2341, 2341 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Skyla 
Mitchell, Note, Escape from the Byzantine World of Mechanical Licensing, 24 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1250 (2007). 
168  See Copyright Royalty Board: Governing Laws, http://www.loc.gov/crb/laws (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2008). 
169   1 PATRY, supra note 24, § 1:110. 
170  David Jakhelln & James Menefee, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Intellectual Property Law, 74 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 837, 849 (2006) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(3)). 
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II. THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF 
The first decision of the newl
200
                                                          
distribution of royalties.”171  The CRB “sits en banc” in a “hearing 
process, which includes the potential for discovery, live testimony, 
and other trial-like attributes.”172  After the hearing process, the 
three-judge CRB then makes its rate determinations by way of ma-
jority vote.173  Most significantly, however, the Reform Act “re-
moved the Librarian [of Congress] and the Copyright Office from 
further involvement in royalty adjustment proceedings.”174  As a 
result, the determinations of the CRB are directly appealable to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.175 
THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD’S MARCH 2007 RATE SETTING 
DECISION FOR THE § 114 WEBCASTER’S PERFORMANCE LICENSE 
AND THE § 112 EPHEMERAL LICENSE 
y formed CRB was its March 
7 determination of rates and terms for the § 114 webcaster per-
formance license and § 112 ephemeral license for the period from 
January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010.176  Even with the 
elimination of arbitrators and the new CRB system in place, the re-
sults of the rate-setting proceedings were “eerily reminiscent” to 
those “which occurred in 2002, the last time the royalties were es-
tablished.”177  With the recent decision, however, it is not only 
small and noncommercial webcasters, “but virtually all of the web-
casters involved in the proceeding who believe the royalties have 
been set too high, and that many Internet radio stations will be put 
out of business if [those royalties] remain in place.”178 
171  H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 20 (2004); see 1 PATRY, supra note 24, § 1:110. 
172  Jakhelln & Menefee, supra note 170, at 849 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(2), (b)(6)). 
173  Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(3) (2006). 
174  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,106 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 380).  “The exception is the limited role of the Register of Copyrights on 
questions of law.” Id. at n.72 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(A)(ii), 802(f)(2)(B)(i), and 
802(f)(1)(D)). 
175  Jakhelln & Menefee, supra note 170, at 850. 
176  See Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8; CRB Final Determination, 72 
Fed. Reg. at 24,084.  
177  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
178  Id. 
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The CRB first issued a notice announcing the commencement 
of rate determination proceedings for the § 114 webcaster per-
formance license and the § 112 ephemeral license for the 2006–10 
period on February 16, 2005.179  After the CRB issued its rate de-
termination decision, many parties petitioned the CRB for a rehear-
ing.180  The CRB subsequently denied the petition.181  After the 
rehearing was denied, many parties appealed the CRB’s rate de-
termination decision to the D.C. Court of Appeals.182  At its en-
actment, it was hoped the Reform Act, which eliminated the 
CARPs and established the CRB, would make the statutory license 
“ratemaking and royalty distribution process less expensive and 
more expeditious and efficient.”183  With over three years past 
since the commencement of proceedings, and over a year past 
since the initial rate determination of the CRB, still very little, if 
anything, has been neatly resolved in the way of statutory license 
rates for webcasting.184  It is hard to see how the ends of the Re-
form Act have been achieved at all. 
Before determining royalty rates, the CRB, in its decision, ana-
lyzed the nature and the application of the willing buyer/willing 
seller standard.185  The CRB noted the standard requires a determi-
nation of rates and terms “that most clearly represent the rates and 
terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace” be-
tween a willing buyer and a willing seller.186  Throughout its deci-
sion the CRB relied heavily on the precedent of both the CARP’s 
179  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 7,970 (Feb 15, 2005) (providing a “[n]otice announcing commencement of proceed-
ing with request for Petitions to Participate”).  
180  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,085 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 380).   
181  Id.; In the Matter of Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording and Ephemeral 
Recordings, Order Denying Motions for Rehearing (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www. 
loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-1/motion-denial.pdf. 
182  See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Briefing Dates Set on Inter-
net Radio Royalty Court Appeal, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-
radio-briefing-dates-set-on-internet-radio-royalty-court-appeal.html (Nov. 20, 2007). 
183  H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 21 (2004). 
184  Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, A Year After the Webcasting 
Royalty Decision—No Settlement, Appeal Briefs Filed, http://www. 
broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-a-year-after-the-webcasting-royalty-
decision-no-settlement-appeal-briefs-filed.html (Mar. 15, 2007). 
185  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,087–88 (May 1, 2007) (codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
186  Id. at 24087 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2006)) (emphasis in original). 
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and the Librarian of Congress’ determinations in Webcaster I.187  
Citing to Webcaster I LoC Determination, the CRB attempted to 
clarify the relationship of the statutory factors, which the CRB is to 
consider in its webcasting rate determinations,188 “to the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard.”189  The CRB acknowledged that, in 
the case of both the § 114 webcaster performance license and the § 
112 ephemeral license, the Copyright Act requires the CRB to: 
[T]ake into account evidence presented on such fac-
tors as (1) whether the use of the webcasting ser-
vices may substitute for or promote the sale of 
phonorecords and (2) whether the copyright owner 
or the service provider make relatively larger con-
tributions to the service ultimately provided to the 
consuming public with respect to creativity, tech-
nology, capital investment, cost and risk.190 
However, the CRB insisted that these statutory factors do not 
themselves define the willing buyer/willing seller standard.191  
Rather, the CRB provided that these “statutory factors are merely 
to be considered, along with other relevant factors, to determine 
the rates under the willing buyer/willing seller standard.”192 
In considering the nature of the marketplace in which the will-
ing buyer and the willing seller transact, the parties to the proceed-
ing agreed, and the CRB concurred, that the statutory language “re-
flects Congressional intent for the Judges to attempt to replicate 
rates and terms that ‘would have been negotiated’ in a hypothetical 
marketplace.”193  In this hypothetical market, the CRB explained 
that it would consider the webcasters as buyers, and the record 
companies as sellers.194  The product changing hands essentially 
187  See generally id. at 24,084.  To clarify, the CARP’s report in Webcaster I is referred 
to herein as “Webcaster I CARP Report,” and the Librarian of Congress’ determination in 
Webcaster I is referred to herein as “Webcaster I LoC Determination.” See supra notes 
118 & 125 and accompanying text. 
188  See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i), (ii); id. § 112(e)(4)(A), (B); supra text accompany-
ing note 109. 
189  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087. 
190  Id. at 24,088 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 112(e)(4) and 114(f)(2)(B)). 
191  See id. at 24,087. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. (quoting Webcaster I CARP Report, supra note 119, at 21). 
194  See id. 
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was a blanket license permitting the webcasters to make digital au-
dio transmissions of the “record companies’ complete repertoire of 
sound recordings.”195  Furthermore, the marketplace in which 
these parties transact, would be “one in which no statutory license 
exists,”196 seemingly because the CRB believed that it would be 
hard to consider “a compulsory license, where the licensor has no 
choice but to license,” as truly reflective of “fair market value.”197 
In determining the rates that would be set between a willing 
buyer and seller in a hypothetical marketplace, the CRB acknowl-
edged, and both the copyright owners and webcasters agreed that 
“the best approach . . . is to look to comparable marketplace 
agreements as ‘benchmarks’ indicative of the prices to which will-
ing buyers and willing sellers . . . would agree.”198  The CRB, 
however, strongly rejected proposals by webcasters that would 
consider as a benchmark the rates webcasters pay to performing 
rights organizations such as ASCAP and BMI for the digital per-
formance of musical compositions underlying sound recordings 
(“musical composition benchmark”).199  Rather, the CRB adopted 
a benchmark formulated by one of SoundExchange’s expert wit-
nesses.200  This benchmark was based on rates found in the market 
for interactive webcasting, where users are able to specifically se-
lect music that they will receive by way of digital audio transmis-
sion (“interactive benchmark”).201  Interactive services do not 
qualify for statutory licensing, and hence such services must nego-
tiate privately with record labels for the right use of sound re-
cordings.202  The interactive benchmark “was set by taking the rate 
paid by certain interactive webcast services . . . and adjusting those 
rates to take into account the differences in the statutory services,” 
namely “the lesser value to consumers” using statutory services 
195  Id. (citing Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,244 (July 8, 
2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261)). 
196  Id. 
197  Id. (quoting Noncommercial Educational Broadcasting Compulsory License (Final 
Rule and Order), 63 Fed. Reg. 49,823, 49,834 (Sept. 18, 1998)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
198  Id. at 24,091. 
199  See id. at 24,092, 24,094–95. 
200  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
201  Id. 
202  Id.; supra text accompanying note 99. 
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who “do not have the ability to [interactively] select songs” when 
receiving webcasts.203  The CRB accepted this benchmark because 
it found the “interactive webcasting market is a benchmark with 
characteristics reasonably similar to non-interactive webcast-
ing.”204  In spite of the many inherent differences between interac-
tive and noninteractive services,205 the CRB was comfortable using 
the interactive benchmark because it found that SoundExchange’s 
“expert had applied an appropriate ‘adjustment factor’ to take into 
account the differences in value between a consumer-influenced 
interactive subscription service . . . [and] service[s] that, by law, 
can not be interactive.”206 
While showing much leniency in its willingness to consider the 
analogous, but distinctly different interactive webcasting market as 
the benchmark for setting rates for noninteractivee webcasting, the 
CRB showed no such leeway in its consideration of the web-
caster’s proposed musical composition benchmark.207  In rejecting 
the musical composition benchmark in wholesale fashion, the CRB 
pointed to the inherent differences between sound recordings and 
musical compositions, noting that “substantial empirical evidence 
shows that sound recording rights are paid multiple times the 
amounts paid for musical works rights” in different markets, such 
as those for “digital downloads.”208  However, in using “digital 
downloads” as part of the basis for rejecting the musical composi-
tion benchmark by comparison, the CRB shows questionable rea-
soning.  Digital downloads implicate a totally different exclusive 
right of the copyright owner than the right at issue in the CRB’s 
rate determination proceeding: that being the right of reproduction, 
as opposed to the right of performance.209  To imply that because 
203  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
204  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,092. 
205  Indeed the differences between interactive and noninteractive services arguably ac-
count for much of the turmoil that gave rise to the legislative reform with respect to web-
casters in the DMCA. See supra Part I. 
206  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
207  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,092, 24,094–95. 
208  Id. at 24,094.  
209  See 3 PATRY, supra note 24, § 8.23; SoundExchange, 
http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “FAQ” hyperlink under column to the right; 
then follow “Does SoundExchange cover downloads?” hyperlink) (last visited Sep. 1, 
2008) (“A download is governed by the reproduction right . . . .”); see also United States 
v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443–44 
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sound recordings are valued more than musical compositions in the 
market for reproduction, they will be valued more in the market for 
performances as well is to make an unsupported, and unexplained 
comparison across markets.  To analogize, this very well could be 
like saying because people in Alaska pay more for heating their 
homes in an average year than they do for air -conditioning, people 
in Florida are likely do the same.  Admittedly, it may be the case 
that the market for performances and reproductions of sound re-
cordings are closer than those for heating and cooling in Alaska 
and Florida; nonetheless, without a more nuanced explanation and 
understanding of the differences between the markets for the exer-
cise of the exclusive rights of a copyright holder, and the uses of 
sound recordings in those markets, it is difficult to understand why 
the rate paid for the performance of musical compositions is an in-
adequate standard from which to base rates paid for the perform-
ance of sound recordings. 
In a historical context, while “copyright owners of musical 
works have enjoyed the performance right since the end of the 
nineteenth century,”210 sound recordings, with respect to the right 
of performance, have had literally no valuation until as recently as 
1995.211  If the rates paid for the performance of musical composi-
tions are excluded from consideration by comparison, indeed the 
only history then, and perhaps reliable evidence of an approxima-
tion of the value of a performance right for sound recordings in the 
noninteractive webcasting context are the rates set in Webcaster I.  
While the provisions of the SWSA are strict in their provision that 
agreements made under the SWSA shall have no precedential 
value in future proceedings,212 no such restriction applies to the de-
terminations of the CARP and Librarian of Congress in Webcaster 
I.213  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the CRB’s decision liberally re-
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Although we acknowledge the term ‘perform’ should be broadly con-
strued . . . the downloading of a music file is more accurately characterized as a method 
of reproducing that file.”). 
210  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086 n.3.  
211  See supra Part I. 
212  See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 
68 Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,008  (June 11, 2003); see also text accompanying supra note 
140. 
213  Indeed, 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) provides that the CRB, in its proceedings “shall act in 
accordance with regulations issued by the Copyright Royalty Judges and the Librarian of 
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lied on the CARP’s and Librarian of Congress’ decisions in Web-
caster I as precedent.  Curiously, however, the CRB’s report makes 
no mention of the actual rate determinations made by the Librarian 
of Congress in Webcaster I.  Controversial though the Librarian of 
Congress’ rate determinations may have been at the time,214 by 
comparison to the CRB’s March, 2007 decision, the Librarian of 
Congress’ determination in Webcaster I seems eminently reason-
able.  At the very least the Librarian of Congress’ rate determina-
tions in Webcaster I were based on a marketplace benchmark that 
can actually said to be representative in some part of the market-
place at issue, namely that for digital audio transmissions made by 
a noninteractive webcaster.215  In not acknowledging the Librarian 
of Congress’ chosen benchmark and ultimate rate determinations 
in Webcaster I, the CRB essentially ignored actual evidence of the 
value afforded to the digital performance of sound recordings by a 
willing buyer and a willing seller.  Effectively then, the CRB 
through its use of abstract, hypothetical benchmarks, determined 
and applied its own market value for the use of sound recordings 
by noninteractive webcasters.  This undoubtedly sets a dangerous 
precedent for CRB determinations in the future. 
Nevertheless, the CRB concluded that the interactive bench-
mark, by itself “[p]rovides the [b]est [b]enchmark for [s]etting” 
rates for commercial webcasters.216  As a result, the CRB aban-
doned the 0.07¢ per-performance standard that had been in place 
for commercial webcasters since Webcaster I, and determined a 
new, per-performance rate which steeply escalates in each succes-
sive year.217  Under the CRB’s determination, the new rates for 
commercial webcasters per year are as follows: 2006: 0.08¢ per-
 
Congress, and on the basis of a written record, prior determinations and interpretations of 
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, Librarian of Congress, the Register of Copyrights, [and] 
copyright arbitration royalty panels . . . .”  
214  See supra Part I. 
215  Recall that in Webcaster I, the Librarian of Congress based his rate determinations 
on a willing buyer/willing seller model that largely looked to settlement agreements vol-
untarily negotiated between RIAA and Yahoo! for the digital performance of sound re-
cordings by Yahoo!’s noninteractive webcasting stations. See Webcaster I LoC Determi-
nation, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,245 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261); 
Delchin, supra note 2, at 376; text accompanying supra note 128. 
216  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,095 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 380).  
217  See Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
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performance; 2007: 0.11¢ per-performance; 2008: 0.14¢ per-
performance; 2009: 0.18¢ per-performance; and in 2010: 0.19¢ 
per-performance.218  These rate increases have proven so dramatic 
that even the largest commercial webcasters have expressed an in-
tention to cease webcasting operations if the rates remain in ef-
fect.219  Some webcasters have shut down and others fear they will 
soon be forced to follow suit.220  Indeed Time Warner Inc.’s AOL 
has even gone so far as to sell its webcasting business to CBS 
Broadcasting Inc., because it felt “[t]here’s no way [it could] build 
an Internet radio business . . . with these kinds of royalties.”221 
In its rate determination decision, the CRB acknowledged that 
there are two sides of the willing buyer and willing seller equation, 
essentially that of the buyer and that of the seller, and that the 
CRB’s objective is to create rates representative of a willing 
agreement between these two sides.222  It is hardly apparent, how-
ever, to see how a buyer of services would willingly agree to rates 
and terms so ruinous that they would make it difficult to “let [their] 
business operate at a profit.”223  Moreover, it is hard to see how 
such conditions would even benefit a willing seller: if rates are set 
so high so as to eliminate a buyer’s profitable participation in the 
marketplace, surely buyers will withdraw, leaving the seller with 
its own product in hand, having clearly exceeded an optimal pric-
ing for its product. 
Furthermore, the CRB’s decision eliminated the pay as a per-
centage-of-revenue model that arguably allowed many small web-
casters to survive after the Librarian of Congress’ determination in 
Webcaster I.224  Under the SWSA, royalty rates “based on reve-
nues or expenses meant the payments would never exceed the sta-
tions’ revenues and put them at risk of going out of business. The 
new rate formula the CRB decreed in its March [2007] ruling ef-
218  See id. 
219  Meg Tirrell, Yahoo, AOL May Abandon Web Radio After Royalties Rise (Update2), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103 
&sid=a0pKOrcpw6yE&refer=us. 
220  Bray, supra note 14. 
221  Id. 
222  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,091 (May 1, 2007) (codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
223  Bray, supra note 14. 
224  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,088–90; supra Part I.  
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fectively remove[d] that safe harbor.”225  Nevertheless the CRB 
“specifically rejected a percentage of revenue royalty for reasons 
including the difficulty of determining what revenues would be 
covered by such a royalty.”226  The CRB declined to apply a 
“revenue-based metric” to both commercial and noncommercial 
webcasters alike.227  The CRB “also imposed a $500 minimum fee 
on each station or channel” operated by a webcaster.228  “These 
new rates will also have an immediate administrative impact on 
webcasters.  Since the rate is calculated on a performance per lis-
tener basis, each webcaster will have to track performances for 
each individual listener to determine its royalty payments.”229 
Merely as a study in contrast, and not to equate the two differ-
ent commodities at issue, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York recently convened to determine 
Yahoo!, AOL and RealNetwork’s application for a blanket license 
from ASCAP.230  The blanket license was to cover the perform-
ance of musical compositions from the ASCAP repertoire on both 
interactive and noninteractive music platforms offered by these 
services.231  Although the court was to determine usage rates for 
the performance of musical compositions as opposed to sound re-
cordings, the standard for determining this rate was similar to that 
used in the CRB’s rate setting procedure for the performance of 
sound recordings by noninteractive webcasters.232  Specifically, in 
225  Anthony L. Soudatt & Natalie Sulimani, Net Radio and Royalty Rates, The Sounds, 
Perhaps, of Silence, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 2008, § 2, at 1. 
226  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
227  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,090 (May 1, 2007) (codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).  
228  Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 225, at 4. 
229  Id. 
230  See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F. Supp. 
2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), available at http://www.ascap.com/press/2008/ 
pdf/ratecourtdecision.pdf; Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Rate Court 
Determines ASCAP Fees for Large Webcasters—Some Interesting Contrasts with The 
Copyright Royalty Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-
radio-rate-court-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-contrasts-
with-the-copyright-royalty-board-decision.html (May 1, 2008). 
231  See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Rate Court Determines 
ASCAP Fees for Large Webcasters—Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright 
Royalty Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-rate- 
court-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-contrasts-with-the-
copyright-royalty-board-decision.html (May 1, 2008). 
232  See id. 
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“determining a reasonable fee for [an ASCAP] blanket license” the 
court was to make an “appraisal of [its] fair market value—an ap-
praisal based essentially on an estimation of the price a willing 
buyer and a willing seller would agree to in an arms-length trans-
action.”233 
In spite of the nearly identical standards, the rate structure 
adopted by the Southern District of New York in the case of the 
ASCAP license was drastically different than that created by the 
CRB in its rate determinations for noninteractive webcasters.  
Whereas the CRB implemented a royalty calculated on a per-
performance basis,234 the Southern District of New York adopted a 
royalty based on a percentage of revenue for the performance of 
musical compositions.235  While the CRB bluntly rejected a royalty 
based on a percentage of revenue, in the case of the ASCAP blan-
ket license, the court was ample in its praise of the percentage of 
revenue approach, in essence observing that: 
[1] It was economically efficient, as it did not pro-
vide any disincentive to a service not to use music 
as might be the case for a royalty that demanded a 
per performance fee; 
[2] It adapts to changing conditions, as it will col-
lect more when a service makes more revenue and 
less when a service has hard economic times, thus 
taking into account changing economic and com-
petitive conditions, variations in financial fortunes 
and changes in technology and other unforeseen 
changes in the circumstances of the services that 
may occur over time; 
[3] Revenues were simple to verify as information 
about total revenues were routinely collected by a 
service; 
[4] . . . [T]hese royalties provided the kinds of effi-
ciencies expected for a blanket license—easy ad-
233  Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).  
234  See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text. 
235  See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 498. 
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ministration, that covered all rights to all the music 
represented by ASCAP, and gave the service cer-
tainty as to its music costs so that it did not need to 
take royalties into account in deciding how to intro-
duce any new aspect of its service.236 
Although the ASCAP blanket license covers a different com-
modity (again musical compositions as opposed to sound re-
cordings), the economic principles behind the licensing aren’t all 
that different from those in the § 114 webcaster performance li-
cense.  Indeed, in the case of the ASCAP license, the court set this 
rate structure for not only noninteractive services, but for interac-
tive services as well,237 which arguably could demand a higher 
royalty on account of the end user’s ability to select preferred mu-
sical compositions.238  Even if it’s assumed that the market for the 
performance of musical compositions doesn’t provide an 
analagous hypothetical marketplace for the performance of sound 
recordings, nonetheless, many of the efficiencies of the per per-
centage of revenue royalty noted by the court in the case of the 
blanket license from ASCAP could apply equally well in the case 
of the § 114 webcaster performance license, really as they could 
for most any business model.  Essentially, a royalty structure that 
responds to and respectively taxes both increased and decreased 
use equally, as the percentage of revenue royalty in the case of the 
ASCAP blanket license does, seems far more representative of an 
agreement between a willing buyer and a willing seller, than a roy-
alty that has the potential to ultimately exceed revenue, as does that 
determined by the CRB in the case of the § 114 webcaster per-
236  Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Rate Court Determines ASCAP 
Fees for Large Webcasters—Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright Royalty 
Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-rate-court-
determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-contrasts-with-the-
copyright-royalty-board-decision.html (May 1, 2008); see Am. Soc’y of Composers, Au-
thors & Publishers, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 480–81. 
237  See supra note 231 and accompanying text.  
238  See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Rate Court Determines 
ASCAP Fees for Large Webcasters—Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright 
Royalty Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-rate-
court-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-contrasts-with-the-
copyright-royalty-board-decision.html (May 1, 2008). 
VOL19_BOOK1_CAREY 12/3/2008  12:42:03 PM 
2008] INTERNET RADIO: COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD RATE DECISION 295 
                                                          
formance license and its counterpart, the § 112 ephemeral li-
cense.239 
The flaws with respect to the CRB’s rate determinations are 
perhaps even more troubling with respect to noncommercial web-
casters. In its decision, the CRB created a “two tiered royalty rate” 
for noncommercial webcasters.240  On the first tier of this struc-
ture, the $500 per channel fee241 paid by noncommercial web-
casters covers “up to 159,140 Aggregate Tuning Hours . . . of 
streaming per month.”242  If these webcasters stay within this 
streaming threshold, they need pay no more in royalties beyond the 
$500 cap.243  However, “[n]oncommercial webcasters who ex-
ceed” the 159,140 ATH streaming limit on the first tier, pay the 
full “commercial rate for all listening in excess of that limit” on the 
second tier.244  The 159,140 ATH threshold is one that the many 
popular noncommercial webcasters are sure to routinely exceed.245  
Thus, while noncommercial webcasters paid a 0.02¢ per-
performance rate before the CRB’s March 2007 decision,246 by 
subjecting noncommercial webcasters to full commercial rates, 
which themselves have increased substantially based on the CRB’s 
use of the interactive benchmark, by 2010, noncommercial web-
casters who exceed the minimum threshold, will pay at a rate of 
0.19¢ per-performance, a rate more than nine times greater than 
239  See Bray, supra note 14; supra text accompanying note 222.  
240  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
241  See supra note 228 and accompanying text.  
242  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
243  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,097, 24,100 (May 1, 2007) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
244  Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8; see CRB Final Determination, 72 
Fed. Reg. at 24,100; supra text accompanying note 217. 
245  See KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream 
Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Oct. 
21, 2008).  An explanation of the 159,140 ATH cap provides as follows: 
A station could have 218 streaming listeners per hour for each twenty 
four hour day in a month. Since most listeners are not online the 
maximum amount per month, the number of average listeners a sta-
tion can have and remain under the cap is larger than 218.  
If a station’s average listener is online four hours a day, it could have 
1,300 average listeners per month; if the average listener streamed 
music two hours a day, a station could have 2,600 average listeners 
per month without exceeding the cap. 
Id. 
246  See supra Part I. 
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that previously in place for noncommercial webcasters.247  In the 
words of the CARP in Webcaster I, surely this “affronts common 
sense.”248  Indeed “[i]n the over 25 years that public radio has paid 
on-air or online music royalties, this is the first time that a decision 
has failed to differentiate public radio from commercial media.”249
Furthermore, even amongst noncommercial webcasters that 
would routinely fall under the cap, “[m]any stations do not have 
the data to measure ATH.”250  Indeed, NPR calculates that almost 
80% of its member stations would not be able to calculate listener 
volume based on ATH.251  The reportage requirement alone has 
even resigned some stations to stop streaming altogether.252 
In its consideration of noncommercial webcasters, the CRB de-
fined a “segmented” marketplace that ultimately gave rise to the 
CRB’s determination of a two-tiered royalty structure.253  While 
the CRB recognized that there are differences between commercial 
and noncommercial webcasters, the CRB credited these differences 
“only up to a certain point.”254  That point, essentially, was the 
159,140 ATH streaming per month threshold, beyond which the 
CRB subjected noncommercial webcasters to full commercial roy-
alty rates.255  The CRB reasoned that noncommercial webcasters 
who operate below this cap represent a distinct, different segment 
of the marketplace, than do noncommercial webcasters who oper-
ate above it.256  This is the segmented marketplace the opinion rec-
247  See Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. 
248  Webcaster I CARP Report, supra note 119, at 89. 
249  KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream Mu-
sic Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Oct. 21, 
2008). 
250  Id. 
251  Press Release, National Public Radio, NPR Files Motion for Rehearing with Copy-
right Royalty Board (Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/about/press/ 
2007/031907.copyrightroyalty.html.  
252  See Sarah Snyder, KDNE Ends Online Broadcasts, DOANE LINE, Mar. 6, 2008, 
http://media.www.doaneline.com/media/storage/paper1214/news/2008/03/06/News/ 
Kdne-Ends.Online.Broadcasts-3256145-page2.shtml.  
253  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,097–100 (May 1, 2007) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).  
254  KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream Mu-
sic Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Oct. 21, 
2008). 
255  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,100. 
256  See id. at 24,098, 24,099–100. 
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ognized, likening this segmentation to the way residential electric-
ity users occupy a different segment of the market for electricity 
than do commercial users, and as such are subject to a different us-
age rate correspondingly.257  Likewise, noncommercial webcasters 
who stream above the designated 159,140 ATH usage cap, in the 
eyes of the CRB, become a different creature altogether.  “[A]s a 
matter of pure economic rational based on the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard,” the CRB  seemed to concur with a 
SoundExchange expert who suggested that, beyond a designated 
cap, noncommercial webcasters enjoying a lower royalty rate may 
“cannibalize” the commercial webcasting market.258  Though it 
briefly considered the different factors that distinguish noncom-
mercial webcasting from commercial webcasting, the CRB ulti-
mately concluded that “as webcasting has evolved, some conver-
gence between some noncommercial webcasters can be observed 
ultimately resulting in competition for audience.”259  On the basis 
of this purported convergence, the CRB reasoned that noncommer-
cial webcasters who stream in excess of the designated cap ought 
to be subject to full commercial rates.260 
In reaching this conclusion, the CRB essentially jettisoned 
what it itself had recognized as “a significant history of 
[n]oncommercial [w]ebcasters such as NPR and the copyright 
owners reaching agreement on rates that were substantially lower 
than the applicable commercial rates over the corresponding pe-
riod.”261  The CRB recognized the “myriad of characteristics” that 
set noncommercial webcasters apart from their commercial coun-
terparts: “[n]oncommercial licensees are non-profit organizations”; 
“[t]he noncommercial webcasters’ mission is to provide educa-
tional, cultural, religious and social programming not generally 
available on commercial venues”; “[n]oncommercial webcasters 
have different sources of funding than ad-supported commercial 
webcasters—such as listener donations, corporate underwriting or 
sponsorships, and university funds.”262  In considering all these 
257  Id. at 24,097. 
258  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
259  Id. at 24,098 (emphasis added). 
260  See id. at 24,098, 24,100. 
261  Id. at 24,097. 
262  Id. at 24,098. 
VOL19_BOOK1_CAREY 12/3/2008  12:42:03 PM 
298 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:257 
                                                          
factors, however, the CRB felt that “as webcasting has developed, 
some of these traits have become blurred.”263  However, this ar-
gument is unavailing, and to a degree, tautological.  By definition a 
noncommercial webcaster must maintain these characteristics to 
even be considered a noncommercial webcaster at all.264 
The CRB made much of facts that it saw as blending the com-
mercial and noncommercial webcasting market, such as the fact 
that “college radio stations use the Live365 service to stream their 
simulcasts, making them just another consumer choice available on 
Live365 together with numerous commercial stations.”265  How-
ever in the context of traditional broadcast radio, noncommercial 
stations, much the same, have always been broadcast on the very 
same AM and FM signals as their commercial counterparts, effec-
tively making them “just another consumer choice available” on 
the radio dial.266  Nonetheless, albeit for a different right, non-
commercial entities have traditionally enjoyed a different standard 
than their commercial counterparts with respect to royalty rates, in 
spite of their technological proximity in broadcast radio.267  Why a 
similar proximity should merit a different treatment in the context 
of webcasting is not readily apparent. 
Furthermore, while the willing buyer/willing seller standard 
certainly provides for a less holistic marketplace analysis than the 
801(b) standard,268 surely the unique, non-profit nature of non-
commercial webcasters would affect their resources, status, and 
purchasing power as a willing buyer in the marketplace.  Indeed, it 
would even seem to make intuitive sense that as a willing seller, 
we might expect a higher compensation from a buyer, such as a 
commercial webcaster, whose ultimate use of the product being 
263  Id. 
264  See supra note 7 (defining a noncommercial webcaster as one that is “exempt from 
taxation under the Internal Revenue Code”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (ex-
plaining that “[c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . no part of 
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual” 
are exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code).  
265  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,098. 
266  Id. 
267  See supra text accompanying note 249; see also 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2006) (providing a 
compulsory license for noncommercial broadcasters). 
268  See supra text accompanying note 70. 
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sold was for its own economic gain, as opposed to one with a dis-
tinctly non-profit motive, such as a noncommercial webcaster.  To 
borrow from the CRB’s own example then, it would seem that 
treating large noncommercial webcasters as a distinct and separate 
segment of the marketplace, when their characteristics remain 
largely the same no matter their size, would be like subjecting a 
residential electricity user to full commercial electricity usage rates 
merely because they had an exceedingly large family. 
Even conceding that the willing buyer/willing seller standard 
may be as unaccommodating of the unique nature of noncommer-
cial webcasters as the CRB seemed to construe it, perhaps what is 
most troubling about the CRB’s opinion is its rejection of prior ne-
gotiated agreements between SoundExchange and NPR for the 
digital performance of webcasts between 1998 and 2004 as a 
benchmark for setting rates under the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard.269  The § 114 webcaster performance license directs the 
Copyright Royalty Judges to “establish rates and terms that most 
clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negoti-
ated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller.”270  It is hard to imagine a clearer representation of the 
terms and rates agreed to by a willing buyer and seller, than the 
terms actually agreed to by a willing buyer and seller, as were in-
deed represented in the NPR-SoundExchange agreements.  Given 
the few prior examples of a comparable valuation for the perform-
ance right of sound recordings, the CRB, once again, set a danger-
ous precedent by ignoring actual evidence of an agreement be-
tween a willing buyer and a willing seller for the very right at 
issue.  Troubling too is the CRB’s rationale for rejecting the NPR-
SoundExchange agreements as an adequate benchmark: that an 
“agreement covering streaming from 1998 to 2004 does not pro-
vide clear evidence of a per station rate that could be viewed as a 
proxy for one that a willing buyer and a willing seller would nego-
tiate today.”271  In lopsided fashion, the CRB seemed to make no 
provision for an adjustment factor, comparable to the one it liber-
ally used in adapting the interactive webcasting market as a 
269  See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,098.  
270  17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
271  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,098. 
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benchmark for setting rates for noninteractive webcasters,272 for 
adjusting a 1998 to 2004 agreement to cover the 2006 to 2010 time 
period for rates covering an identical product and usage. 
With regard to the § 112 ephemeral license, for both commer-
cial and noncommercial webcasters, the CRB determined “the ap-
propriate § 112 reproduction license rate . . . to be included in the 
applicable respective § 114 license rates.” 273  In sum total, by sub-
jecting noncommercial webcasters to full commercial rates, the 
CRB has presented noncommercial webcasters with an inherent 
conflict of interest. Historically speaking: 
[a]n element of public radio’s mission, whether by 
broadcast or webcast, is to introduce music and mu-
sical performers to the largest possible audience.  
Under the CRB decision, however, the more public 
radio succeeds in that mission, the larger the fees 
become.  Practically and financially speaking, the 
newly proposed fee structure penalizes public radio 
for performing its statutorily-based public service 
mission.  The CRB decision is directly contrary to 
the intentions of the Congress’ public policy objec-
tives in establishing public radio. 
The new fee structure imposes a commercial finan-
cial and revenue model on the public service, not-
for-profit operations of public radio webcasters.  
This model is not only inappropriate, but cannot be 
sustained by public radio webcasters who operate 
for the public good, not their own commercial suc-
cess.274 
If permitted to stand, the CRB decision will certainly have a 
powerful impact on the still nascent webcasting industry.  Very lit-
tle of this impact, it would seem, would stand to benefit Internet 
radio, noncommercial or otherwise, and by extension, either a will-
ing buyer or willing seller in the noninteractive webcasting market. 
272  See supra text accompanying notes 197–205. 
273  CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,088. 
274  KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream Mu-
sic Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Aug. 16, 
2008). 
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III. TRY A LITTLE TENDERNESS: A CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED 
ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT WEBCASTING RATE 
DETERMINATION PROCEDURE 
Although the CRB’s March 2007 rate determination for the § 
114 webcaster performance license and § 112 ephemeral license is 
presently being appealed before the D.C. Court of Appeals, the 
statutory standard for review of a CRB decision is “exceptionally 
differential.”275  Under the CRB, and the CARP process before 
that, rate determination proceedings for the digital performance 
right have undoubtedly created much conflict between webcasters, 
the recording industry and the U.S. Copyright Office alike.  In 
terms of a resolution for this conflict, while a successful appeal of 
the CRB’s rate determination is not impossible, it will certainly be 
difficult given the standard of review and the present statutory 
standards for setting license rates.276  Even if the CRB’s determi-
nation were to be set aside, however, such a ruling would really 
only address the symptom and leave the disease uncured.  To a de-
gree, many arguments that are being leveled against the CRB’s de-
cision echo those made in the wake of Webcaster I, where it was 
recognized that: “[e]ven if the CARP simply misinterpreted the 
[willing buyer/willing seller] standard, Congress should revise the 
standard instead of hoping that the Panel gets it right next time.”277  
While the SWSA provided relief from many such concerns after 
Webcaster I, indeed such relief has proven to be a temporary band-
aid on a much more enduring problem.  If there was any downfall 
to the SWSA, perhaps it was in securing clemency across the web-
casting industry in place of resolve to address the statutory stan-
dards that gave rise to the need for the SWSA in the first place.  
Unfortunately, webcasters now find themselves in a similar imbro-
glio as a result of a statutory rate proceeding.  Although their tim-
ing is certainly less than perfect, many parties have now turned to 
275  Jakhelln & Menefee, supra note 170, at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
17 U.S.C. § 801(d)(3) (2006) (citing to the standards provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
276  Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, What Next for Internet Radio In 
Light of the Copyright Royalty Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/ 
archives/internet-radio-what-next-for-internet-radio-in-light-of-the-copyright-royalty-
board-decision.html (Mar. 7, 2007). 
277  Recent Legislation, supra note 6, at 1926.  
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Congress in hopes of revising the relevant statutory standards.278  
Ultimately such revision may be what is needed to resolve the pre-
sent tension surrounding webcasting royalty rates. 
Perhaps the most fruitful proposal before Congress is one set 
forth in the Internet Radio Equality Act (“IREA”).279  Amongst 
other things, the IREA proposes to revise the statutory rate setting 
procedure by replacing the willing buyer/willing seller standard 
used to determine royalty rates for the § 114 webcaster perform-
ance license and the § 112 ephemeral license, with the 801(b)(1) 
standard that was originally applied to noninteractive subscription 
services and preexisting satellite digital audio radio services under 
the DPRA.280  As opposed to the strict marketplace rationale of the 
willing buyer/willing seller standard, the 801(b)(1) standard seeks 
to balance “the needs of copyright owners, copyright users, and the 
public” in setting statutory rates.281  The CRB has used the 
801(b)(1) standard to set royalty rates for satellite radio for its digi-
tal audio transmissions of sound recordings.  It is exactly the same 
right for which the CRB subjects webcasters to the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard.  As a consequence of the 801(b)(1) 
standard, satellite radio pays a “revenue based royalty” that 
amounts to “between six and eight percent of revenues,” a “much 
lower rate” than that which the CRB’s recent decision would im-
pose on webcasters.282 
As a matter of basic fairness, “[i]t is hard to reconcile [the] dis-
parate rate structures” that the present statutory scheme has 
yielded.283  “Satellite radio, XM and Sirius, are subscription-based 
services that have much deeper pockets than do the majority of 
278  See Daniel McSwain, Internet Radio Equality Act Introduced in House, RADIO & 
INTERNET NEWSL., Apr. 26, 2007, v.2, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/ 
042607b/index.shtml; see also Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Senate 
Hearing: The Search for Compromise on Music Performance Royalties—Part One: The 
Issue of Standards,  http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-senate-
hearing-the-search-for-compromise-on-music-performance-royalties-part-one-the-issue-
of-standards.html (July 30, 2008) (comparing “The Perform Act” with “The Internet Ra-
dio Equality Act”). 
279  H.R. 2060, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=h110-2060. 
280  See McSwain, supra note 278, at v.2; supra text accompanying note 70.  
281  McSwain, supra note 278, at v.2. 
282  Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 225, at 8. 
283  Id. at 8–9. 
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Internet webcasters.”284  Moreover, if we look at the historical ra-
tionale for the creation of a digital performance right, the concerns 
with webcasting first articulated under the DPRA were specifically 
with regard to subscription- and interactive-based services.285  In-
deed, originally: 
[T]he distinction between subscription and non-
subscription transmissions was made because it was 
felt that the risk of a music service which consum-
ers pay for on a subscription basis poses a moderate 
to high risk of replacing the sales of records (either 
physical CDs or digital phonorecord deliveries), 
while those which are on a nonsubscription basis, 
like traditional, advertising supported radio broad-
casts, and the like, pose only a low risk of replacing 
record sales.286 
Taking this historical rationale for the distinction between sub-
scription and nonsubscription services into consideration, it would 
seem to make even less sense to subject nonsubscription based ser-
vices to the harsher, less encompassing willing buyer/willing seller 
standard, while setting rates for subscription-based services, which 
are potentially more threatening to the music industry, under the 
801(b)(1) standard.287 
The disparity between standards for varying services is even 
starker if we look to traditional broadcast radio, where still, in spite 
of proposed legislation,288 no performance right for sound re-
cordings is recognized at all.  The idea of affording traditional ra-
284  Id. at 8. 
285  See supra text accompanying note 61.  
286  Kohn, supra note 51, at 12. 
287  See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, What a Difference a Stan-
dard Makes, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-satellite-radio-
music-royalty-reconsideration-denied-by-copyright-royalty-board-what-a-difference-a-
standard-makes.html (Jan. 12, 2008). 
288  See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, More on the Broadcast Per-
formance Royalty Bills,  http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/broadcast-
performance-royalty-more-on-the-broadcast-performance-royalty-bills.html (Dec. 19, 
2007); Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Senate Hearing:  
The Search for Compromise on Music Performance Royalties—Part One: The Issue of 
Standards,  http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-senate-hearing-
the-search-for-compromise-on-music-performance-royalties-part-one-the-issue-of-
standards.html (July 30, 2008).  
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dio broadcasters almost sacrosanct protection against the imposi-
tion of a sound recording performance right has traditionally been 
justified by the promotional value radio air play has been said to 
have on the sale of sound recordings.289  This justification, how-
ever, quickly loses currency if sales of sound recordings start to 
decline in any period, as they have done precipitously since the on-
set of the digital music era.290  Looking at the broader picture then, 
it’s perhaps not all that hard to see below the surface of Congress’ 
rationale in enacting the DMCA at the insistence of the RIAA, and 
subjecting webcasters, and webcasters only, to the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard.  At a time when the webcasting in-
dustry was still very much in development, and paralleled to a de-
gree by the very separate, but nonetheless devastating impact of il-
legal music downloading, perhaps Congress was rightfully 
concerned with the potential effect webcasting would have on the 
market for sales of sound recordings.291  Perhaps, moreover, sub-
jecting webcasters to the willing buyer/willing seller standard was 
seen as a way to check a growing industry, a precautionary meas-
ure taken to guard against an as of yet unforeseen development. 
To the extent this rationale made sense at the time, it may now 
be even more appropriate to take measure of the realities of the 
webcasting industry, and to adjust the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard to the 801(b)(1) standard.  Recognizing a sound recording 
performance right makes good sense as a means of compensating 
the music industry for the use of its copyrighted content, especially 
in an era when its traditional streams of revenue have been so ruin-
ously drained.  It strains reason, however, to think the ideal solu-
tion is to subject a limited segment of the market for the perform-
ance of sound recordings to a particularly stringent rate-setting 
standard,292 to leave another segment of that market completely 
289  See supra note 36.  
290  See generally Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The Record Industry’s Decline, ROLLING 
STONE, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/15137581/ 
the_record_industrys_decline; Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, Plunge 
Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/ 
SB117444575607043728-oEugjUqEtTo1hWJawejgR3LjRAw_20080320.html. 
291  See Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 2003). 
292  Namely this refers to webcasters who are subject to the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard.  
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exempt from paying royalties,293 and to leave a third market mid-
dling somewhere in between.294  A proposed solution would be to 
subject webcasters, radio broadcasters and satellite radio subscrip-
tion services alike to a unilateral statutory license for the public 
performance of sound recordings, digital or otherwise, as deter-
mined by a panel of judges seeking to implement the standards 
provided for under the 801(b)(1) standard.  So doing, it seems, 
would inherently allow services on all platforms to operate at a 
royalty rate that would allow their continued operation.  Under 
such a standard, stations would be less likely to sporadically shut 
down on the occasion of every CRB rate determination proceeding, 
which have been shown to yield unsustainable royalties under their 
present administration.  In turn, by subjecting all mediums of the 
performance of sound recordings to a statutory licensing scheme 
under the 801(b)(1) standard, copyright owners would undoubtedly 
receive steady revenue from a source that just over thirteen years 
ago provided no income at all.  Any losses that sound recording 
owners feel they would lose by subjecting webcasters to the 
801(b)(1) standard instead of the willing buyer/willing seller stan-
dard could easily be offset by the expansion of the sound recording 
performance right to include transmissions by traditional radio 
broadcasters.  This is of course presuming that there would be any 
losses at all; a sustainable royalty in the first instance may very 
well lead to more webcasting stations, and in turn more potential 
sources of revenue for a recording industry that should be seeking 
to adapt its business model to account for the realities of the mar-
ket it serves.295 
In conclusion, subjecting webcasters, subscription and satellite 
radio services, and traditional radio broadcasters alike to a statu-
tory licensing scheme under a unilateral 801(b)(1) standard, or a 
close equivalent, seems to be a strong solution to the current diffi-
culties posed by the institution and administration of a sound re-
cording performance right.  With respect particularly to web-
293  Namely this refers to traditional radio broadcasters, who are not subject to any roy-
alty rate for the performance of sound recordings. 
294  Namely this refers to satellite radio subscription services, which are subject to the 
801(b)(1) standard.  
295  Rather than trying to adapt the market to fit an unrealistic business model. 
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casters, this proposal is in keeping with the basic purpose of the 
Copyright Act.  As Justice Stewart described that purpose: 
The limited scope of the copyright holders’s statu-
tory monopoly . . . reflects a balance of competing 
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to 
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation 
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other 
arts.296 
The virtues of webcasting have been extolled by its advocates 
as providing the public with a far more diverse range of program-
ming than traditional broadcast radio, under its current limitations, 
could ever hope to provide.297  A ruling like that of the Copyright 
Royalty Board’s, which runs counter to the ends of promoting a 
service such as webcasting, inherently conflicts with the Copyright 
Act’s mandate that the copyright laws “ultimately serve the cause 
of promoting broad public availability” of the arts.298  In keeping 
with that mandate, Congress should intervene on behalf of web-
casters, and by extension the public at large, to institute standards 
that will ensure the continued vitality of the burgeoning cultural 
outlet of webcasting. 
ADDENDUM: THE WEBCASTER SETTLEMENT ACT OF 2008 
As this Comment was going to press, Congress passed legisla-
tion in the form of the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 which 
bears significantly on the issues this Comment raises.299   The leg-
islation was introduced in light of the CRB’s March 2007 decision 
296  MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 374 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 522 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).  
297  See Delchin, supra note 2, at 360–64; Bray, supra note 14. 
298  MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 374 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 522 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
299  See Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 114); Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Senate Approves 
Webcaster Settlement Act (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.savenetradio.org/ 
latest_news/08-10-01.html. The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 was signed into law 
by the President of the United States on October 16, 2008. See GovTrack.us, H.R. 7084: 
Webcaster Settelement Act of 2008, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-
7084 (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
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in an effort to help support “the survival of webcasting . . . in the 
United States”300 and passed the House of Representatives by 
voice vote and the Senate by unanimous consent.301   
In rough terms, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 grants 
SoundExchange and webcasters until February 15, 2009 to negoti-
ate a settlement agreement to replace the royalty rates set for web-
casters by the CRB in its March 2007 decision.302  Many voices in 
Congress seem to represent that the parties affected by the CRB’s 
decision are “gradually coming together, and growing closer to 
finding common ground.”303  However because Congress is going 
into recess, and “[b]ecause the parties will not be able to finish 
their negotiations before Congress recesses . . . and because au-
thority by Congress is required for a settlement to take effect under 
the government compulsory license” Congress proposed this legis-
lation.304  In effect, it gives the parties the necessary authority to 
reach a settlement agreement on their own, without Congress’ in-
tervention, in the hopes that “negotiations . . . continue in a posi-
tive direction for both sides.”305  To those ends the Webcaster Set-
tlement Act of 2008 “grants limited statutory authority to 
SoundExchange . . . to enter into and negotiate agreements with 
webcasters for the performance of sound recordings over the Inter-
net.”306 
This compromise solution is reminiscent of the results from 
Webcaster I, whereby many webcasters would have ceased opera-
300  154 Cong. Rec. H10278-01, H10279 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Inslee, author of the legislation). 
301  Tony Dutra, Legislation/Webcasting: Congress Votes to Allow Webcasters to Nego-
tiate with Sound Exchange, 76 BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 753 (2008).  It is 
not insignificant to note that the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 was passed while 
Congress was in the midst of considering a highly publicized $700 billion government 
bailout of the nation’s financial institutions. Posting by Eliot Van Buskirk to Wired Lis-
tening Post Blog, Congress Considers Webcaster Bill Too, as Royalty Battle Ensues, 
http://blog.wired.com/music/2008/09/congress-to-con.html (Sep. 26, 2008, 04:06:15 
PM).  
302  See Dutra, supra note 301.  
303  154 Cong. Rec. E2148-02, E2148 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Blackburn); see also 154 Cong. Rec. H10278-01, 10278, 10280 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) 
(statements of Rep. Berman and Rep. Inslee respectively).  
304  154 Cong. Rec. H10278-01, H10279 (statement of Rep. Berman). 
305  Id. 
306  Id. (statement of Rep. Smith). 
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tions if it weren’t for Congress’ intervention in the form of the 
SWSA.307  In fact, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 essen-
tially revises the Copyright Act by substituting the words “‘Web-
caster Settlement Act of 2008’” for the words “‘Small Webcasters 
Settlement Act of 2002’”308 (“SWSA”) and updating the timeline 
for agreements from 1998 to 2004 to “‘a period of not more than 
11 years beginning on January 1, 2005.’”309   To encourage settle-
ment discussions among the relevant parties, the Webcaster Set-
tlement Act of 2008 modifies a handful of the conditions of the 
SWSA.310  Namely, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008: makes 
the SWSA’s requirement that any agreements between SoundEx-
change and webcasters include a provision “for payment of royal-
ties on the basis of a percentage of revenue or expenses” permis-
sive instead of mandatory;311 deletes “[a]ll instances of the word 
‘small’ . . . such that all webcasters are now able to make private 
deals;”312 and, in contrast to the SWSA, the Webcaster Settlement 
Act of 2008 allows “parties to agree that their alternative rates may 
be precedential in future rate-setting proceedings.”313 
The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 should be regarded with 
optimism for the solution it may yield to the complex problem dis-
cussed in this Comment.  Such optimism, however, should be tem-
pered with a broader perspective.  The Webcaster Settlement Act 
of 2008 is merely a mechanism to facilitate settlement negotia-
tions.  As this Comment was going to press, the Webcaster Settle-
ment Act of 2008 has not yet yielded any rates in settlement; in-
deed it remains to be seen “if the hard part—actually entering into  
307  See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Webcaster Settlement Act—
What Does it Mean?, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-
webcaster-settlement-act-what-does-it-mean.html (Oct. 1, 2008); supra Part I.E. 
308  Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, sec. 2(4)(A), § 
114(f)(5)(D), 122 Stat. 4974, 4974. 
309  Id. at sec. 2(1)(B), § 114(f)(5)(A), 122 Stat. 4974, 4974. 
310  See generally Dutra, supra note 301. 
311  Dutra, supra note 301; Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, sec. 
2(1)(D), § 114(f)(5)(A), 122 Stat. 4974, 4974.  
312  Dutra, supra note 301; Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, sec. 
2 passim, § 114(f)(5) passim, 122 Stat. 4974, 4974. 
313  Dutra, supra note 301; Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, sec. 
2(3)(C), § 114(f)(5)(C), 122 Stat. 4974, 4974. 
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. . . settlements—will occur.”314  While the Webcaster Settlement 
Act of 2008 certainly has the potential to help webcasters survive 
the CRB’s March 2007 royalty rate determinations, it should be 
recognized as well for what it fails to achieve.  Perhaps most im-
portantly, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 does not change 
the statutory standard for determining the rates webcasters pay for 
the performance of sound recordings.315  As such, the Webcaster 
Settlement Act of 2008 addresses only a fraction of a much larger 
problem.  
To a degree, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 is consis-
tent with the criticism this Comment levies against CRB rates 
yielded by the willing/buyer willing seller standard.  It seems to be 
a recognition that the rates imposed by the CRB were unsustain-
able, and perhaps an implicit suggestion that the process that led to 
the creation of those rates is flawed.  As was observed in commen-
tary in the Senate, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 is, in ef-
fect, a “legislative readjustment[].”316  In other words, it allows the 
relevant parties to work around the results of Congress’ own rate-
setting procedure, because the results produced by that procedure 
proved to be unsustainable.  It would seem to this Comment’s au-
thor that an ideal solution would address not just the results of that 
procedure, as the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 seems to do, 
but would remedy the procedure that lead to those results as well.  
Indeed, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 still leaves the po-
tential, as anticipated by this Comment, of webcasters having to 
shut down operations on the occasion of every CRB rate determi-
nation,317 until and unless Congress is able to intervene with simi-
lar “legislative readjustments”318 in future proceedings. It would 
stand to reason that an ideal rate-setting standard would lead di-
rectly to the results anticipated by settlement initiatives such as the 
314  Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Webcaster Settlement Act—
What Does it Mean?, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-
webcaster-settlement-act-what-does-it-mean.html (Oct. 1, 2008). 
315  See id. 
316  154 Cong. Rec. S10186-02, S10186 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
317  See supra Part III. 
318  154 Cong. Rec. S10186-02, S10186 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
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SWSA and the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, rather than hop-
ing that resort to such initiatives will be available in the future.    
As such, the thrust of this Comment as outlined in its conclu-
sion remains intact in spite of the Webcaster Settlement Act of 
2008.  It is this author’s hope that the considerations raised in this 
Comment will be addressed by a future Congress which will hope-
fully undertake to resolve the issues underlying the Webcaster Set-
tlement Act of 2008 by revising the relevant statutory standards for 
setting royalty rates for the performance of sound recordings, not 
only for Internet radio, but indeed for broadcast radio and subscrip-
tion services as well.  Congress failed to do so in the wake of the 
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, and after months of tur-
moil resulting from the CRB’s March 2007 rate determination, it is 
hard not to see the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 as a tempo-
rary fix rather than a long term solution to an industry-wide dispar-
ity. 
 
